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ABSTRACT 
The Loss-Processing Framework  
by 
Lawrence D. Childress 
The circumstances of responding to loss due to human death are among the most stressful 
experiences encountered in life. Although grief’s symptoms are typically considered essential to 
their gradual diminishment, possible negative impacts of complications related to grief are also 
well known, and have been associated with detriments to mental and physical health. Grief, 
however, can also generate transformative positive change. Thus, albeit ineludible, responding to 
loss is not uniformly experienced, expressed, or understood. It is also culturally-shaped, making 
attempts to define “normal” grief, as well as to label some grief “abnormal”—and to medicalize 
it—possibly problematic. Bereavement (the situation surrounding a death) and mourning (the 
publicly expressed response to loss due to death) are changing. Some of these changes (e.g., the 
increase in hospice care settings prior to deaths, and alterations in the ritual responses following 
all deaths—irrespective of their context) may have important implications for avoiding grief’s 
possible complications and for promoting its potential benefits. An improved alignment of grief 
theory, research, and practice is warranted; but theories of grief are diverse, and historically have 
not been empirically well-supported. This research articulates a new grief model, the loss-
processing framework, featuring three dimensional components (perception, orientation, and 
direction). As a first step toward validation of the framework, also included is an empirical study 
examining retrospective descriptive reports of adult loss response relating to the first of these 
three dimensions (perception). As an interpretive, translational approach to understanding grief, 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Overview 
The circumstances of responding to loss due to human death are among the most stressful 
experiences encountered in life (Holmes & Rahe, 1967; for brief summary see, e.g., Aoun et al., 
2019; Layne et al., 2017). Scholars have also noted, however, that the symptoms of loss response 
are typically essential to their gradual attenuation (e.g., Durkheim, 1915/1965) and have posited 
the possible import of loss response in relationship to adaptive functioning (e.g., Caplan, 1964; 
Nesse, 2000; Walsh & McGoldrick, 1991/2004), positive personal growth, and creativity (e.g., 
Aldwin, 1994/2007; Elliott, 1999; Fahlberg et al., 1992; Finkel, 1974, 1975; Frankl, 1946/1984; 
Gillies & Neimeyer, 2006; Kessler, 2019; Klein, 1940; Marris, 1974; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 
2002; O’Leary & Ickovics, 1995; Pollock, 1981, 1987, 1989a, b; Rochlin, 1965; Schaefer & 
Moos, 2001; Tedeschi, 1995; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996; Tedeschi et al., 1998; Woodward, 
1990, 1993; Yalom & Lieberman, 1991; for summary see also Hogan & Schmidt, 2002). Others 
have noted empirical studies spanning the globe that evince an association between certain 
complications of loss response and detriments to mental and physical health and well-being (for 
summary see Stroebe et al., 2007; see also, e.g., Parkes, 1972). 
In the U.S., the prevalence of the predominant form of complicated loss response, 
persistent complex bereavement disorder (PCBD)—a condition for further study in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5; American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013)—has been estimated to be as high as 20% (Hensley et al., 
2009; Middleton et al., 1998; Prigerson & Jacobs, 2001; Silverman et al., 2000). Given the death 
rate in the U.S. (Kochanek et al., 2016), estimates indicate that as many as 2.6 million people 
may develop PCBD annually. With baby boomers continuing to age (Ayers et al., 2004; Jemal et 
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al., 2005), and with the estimated 533,000+ COVID-19-related deaths (through March, 2021; 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2021), this number is expected to increase in 
the future—emphasizing the urgency for an improved alignment of loss response theory, 
research, and practice going forward (Ayers et al., 2004; Sandler et al., 2005). As Layne et al. 
(2017) have noted: “This growing recognition of bereavement as a subject of clinical concern 
and study is further demonstrated by the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) inclusion of 
Prolonged Grief Disorder in its International Classification of Diseases, 11th revision (ICD-11; 
World Health Organization [WHO], 2018), which will reach an even wider medical and 
psychiatric audience worldwide than DSM-5…” (p. 267; see also Maercker et al., 2013; 
Maercker & Lalor, 2012; Prigerson et al., 2009). 
Statement of the Problem 
The potential for an increased incidence of complications in loss response in the near 
future, and the prospect of negative health consequences as a result, are important to consider in 
relationship to current/recent trends regarding the predominant context of bereavement in the 
U.S. (palliative/hospice care settings) as well as in relation to possible shifts in the ceremonial 
collective rites of mourning following on death’s occurrence (toward less formalized 
ritualization—or, in some cases, none at all). The individuality of responses to loss due to human 
death, which are not uniformly experienced, expressed, or understood (e.g., Neimeyer & Harris, 
2011; Shuchter & Zisook, 1993; Stroebe et al., 1994), must also be stressed. Furthermore, loss 
responses are typically culturally-shaped (e.g., Bonanno, 1999; Rosenblatt, 2001), making 
attempts to define “normal” grief, as well as to label some manifestations of grief “abnormal”—
and to medicalize it—possibly problematic. 
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Concerns regarding the appropriate labeling of loss response (and the possible 
pathogenesis of some loss responses) are perhaps being exacerbated by the challenge of 
discerning how and why certain aspects of responding to loss may be maladaptive for some 
individuals while for others they are not. Ascertaining what is “normal” grief from what is 
simply divergent or from what is possibly aberrant can be fraught (see, e.g., Bisconti et al., 2004; 
Nesse, 2005; Rubin, 1993; Shapiro, 2001; Zisook & Shuchter, 1986). It is difficult to excavate 
grief’s underlying mechanisms and their potential ramifications (positive, negative, and 
otherwise) with absolute precision. After all, “Grief is a process, not a state” (Parkes, 1970, p. 
445); and, as Stroebe et al. (1993) note: “…even one individual’s grief varies from moment to 
moment” (p. 5). It is also important to remember, especially when attempting to avoid possible 
complications in loss response, that its symptoms are normally considered to be requisite to their 
gradual diminishment (e.g., Durkheim, 1915/1965), and that grief may enhance adaptivity, foster 
transformative personal growth, and generate creativity (see previous citations, p. 9; for 
summary see also Hogan & Schmidt, 2002). 
If grieving well can help make one’s life better, then explaining the dangers of complex 
bereavement may serve, however inadvertently, to diminish understanding(s of) grief’s 
restorative, adaptive, and creative potential. Of course, the opposite may also apply: emphasizing 
grief’s transformational and generative features could risk the prospect of missing signs of 
possible complications related to it. Shapiro (2001) has observed the need to clarify 
“…paradoxes of grief and growth” via “a comprehensive conceptual approach,” noting that “the 
grief literature lacks agreement in conceptualizing and operationalizing pathological versus 
successful bereavement” (p. 302). 
 12 
But conceptual models of grief are diverse, featuring variegated (yet sometimes 
overlapping) and oft-debated research perspectives (see, e.g., Childress, 2015; Papa et al., 2014), 
with roots in different disciplines (Rothaupt & Becker, 2007; Stroebe et al., 1993), and 
professional understandings that are typically based on “alternative discursive frames of 
reference” (Neimeyer, 2001b, p. 264). Although in recent decades bereavement research has 
“burgeoned internationally, giving rise to a greatly expanded trove of models and methods which 
have increasingly been subjected to empirical scrutiny” (Neimeyer, 2014, p. 125), historically 
evidential support for grief theories has remained shallow (Archer, 2008; Bonanno, 1998, 2009; 
Bonanno & Field, 2001; Bonanno & Kaltman, 1999; Breen & O’Connor, 2007; Center for the 
Advancement of Health, 2004; Davis et al., 2000; Lindstrøm, 2002; Stroebe & Schut, 2005; 
Stroebe et al., 2002; Wortman & Silver, 1989, 2001). As Stroebe et al. (1993) note: “…research 
on bereavement typically has not been guided by an integrative theory base” (p. 7). Thus, 
consensus regarding a possible path toward an integrated, unifying, and empirically well-
supported approach to loss response remains elusive. 
Significance 
 Multiple factors underscore the need to enhance understanding of human response to 
loss due to death, or grief. Stroebe et al. (2007) have drawn attention to the adverse effects of 
certain complications of bereavement on health, including an increased risk of mortality—
particularly for certain groups (see also Boyle et al., 2011; Christakis & Iwashyna, 2003; Moon 
et al., 2011; Prigerson et al., 2009; Raphael, 1993; Rees & Lutkins, 1967; Schultze-Florey et al., 
2012; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1993). In the relationship between loss response and health, persistent 
complex bereavement disorder (PCBD; APA, 2013) is at the negative end of the loss response 
continuum and has been associated with an increased risk for cardiac disease, hypertension, 
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cancer, immunological deficiency (Chen et al., 1999; Irwin & Weiner, 1987; Prigerson et al., 
1997; Prigerson et al., 1999), and suicide ideation/completion (Hill et al., 2019;  Latham & 
Prigerson, 2004). It is commonly comorbid with major depressive disorder (MDD), 
posttraumatic stress disorder, and substance use disorders (APA, 2013).  
Of these three, PCBD is most frequently comorbid with depression (Maercker & Lalor, 
2012; see also Brent et al., 1994; McDermott et al., 1997; Pasternak et al., 1993; Zisook et al., 
1997), which is one of the most prevalent, costly, and challenging mental health concerns today 
(Berto et al., 2000)—and the leading cause of disability worldwide (World Health Organization, 
2018a). Both grief complications and MDD are accompanied by an increasing incidence of 
neuropharmacologic interventions (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007; Brody & Gu, 2020); possible 
impacts of these drug-based treatments for complex grief and depressive symptoms on the course 
and outcome of subsequent response(s) to loss are not yet known (see, e.g., Nesse, 2000).  
Other ill effects of complications relating to bereavement may include the disruption of 
neuroendocrine systems (Fletcher, 1996; Goodkin et al., 1995; Pasternak et al., 1994), a 
substantial worsening of activity-limiting pain (Bradbeer et al., 2003), insomnia (Marris, 
1958/2004; Parkes, 1970), somatic disturbances (Shahane et al., 2018), weight loss (Marris, 
1958/2004; Shahar et al.,  2001; Shulz et al., 2001), subjective distress (Maciejewski et al., 
2007), an increase in rates of surgery and hospitalization (Glick et al., 1974), and elevated rates 
of chronic inflammatory conditions, such as cardiovascular disease (Carey et al., 2014; Chirinos 
et al., 2019; Stahl et al., 2016)—which is the leading cause of death both within the U.S. 
(Kochanek et al., 2019) and globally (Finegold et al., 2013). 
Aoun et al. (2019) have noted that adverse outcomes related to complicated grief can 
span emotional, physical, behavioral, and cognitive domains. Raphael (1993) summates the 
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possible negative impacts from grief’s complications to include “…increased presentations for 
medical care, increased substance use and abuse, significant mental health problems, [an] 
increased risk of death for some groups, and, for all, substantial human suffering” (p. xi). As 
Morris and Block (2015) assert: “these [impacts] are not insignificant and have important 
implications for how our society as a whole cares for the bereaved” (p. 915). 
Historically empirical data regarding both positive and negative, or (mal)adaptive, loss 
responses (including—but not limited to—possible complications, their causes/consequences, 
and potential preventions/treatments) have been considered insufficient (see, e.g., Kato & Mann, 
1999). Studies on which to build effective strategies for caring for all those who are bereaved are 
sparse, and appropriate tools for the assessment of loss response may be underdeveloped (Agnew 
et al., 2010). 
Varied theoretical understandings of loss response, an historical paucity of robust 
empirical evidence supporting grief theories, ongoing disagreement regarding bereavement’s 
typical or “normal” course(s), the prospect of labeling (and treating) atypical grief as 
“abnormal,” cross-cultural differences in mourning, and the propensity to medicalize grief are 
some of the factors that have made loss response research especially challenging. The difficulties 
of conducting research on populations experiencing loss due to human death have also been well 
documented (see, e.g., Cassileth & Lusk, 1989; Grande & Todd, 2000; Hudson et al., 2005; 
Hudson & Hayman-White, 2006). 
 As noted above, the identification and implementation of comprehensive bereavement 
measurement instrumentation can also be problematic (see, e.g., Agnew et al., 2010), but is not 
insurmountable (for review see Hudson & Hayman-White, 2006; Neimeyer, 2015a; see also 
Burnett et al., 1997; Deeken et al., 2003; Kristjanson et al., 2005). Although advancements in 
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thanatological research have been a focus for some time, Neimeyer (2001a) has lamented that 
“fervid developments in research…have not been matched either by a consistent sophistication in 
our conceptual models of loss or the generation of new insights into clinical practice” (p. 2). 
Primary Aim  
Assessing loss response is more than looking for possible indicators of a need for 
prevention and/or treatment for maladaptive grieving; it is the concomitant search for positive 
indications of adaptive loss response, which includes the possibility that grief can—and often 
does—effect generative, transformational change. Thus, it is pivotal that research into loss 
response be approached through an appropriate conceptual framework, one grounded in a full 
range of possible manifestations rather than, for example, limited only (or primarily) to those 
considered to be “abnormal”—or to those deemed “normal” when its operationalization has 
proven fraught (see, e.g., Uren & Wastell 2002 for support of viewing grief typology along a 
continuum rather than as dichotomized). Relatedly, cultural variations in grief, and the 
propensity to medicalize it, must also be considered. 
The primary aim of this research is to describe a new framework of loss response and to 
explore the retrospective descriptive reports of bereaved adults relating to it. The loss-processing 
framework consists of three inter-related elements: 1) perception, 2) orientation, and 3) direction. 
In contrast to the longstanding, conventional (mis)conception that components of loss response 
follow one another in a stage- or step-like progression, these dimensional elements intersect, 
interact, and (may) influence one another (for a brief summary of intersectionality, see Warner & 
Shields, 2013; for refutations of stage grief theory, see, e.g., Bonanno & Boerner, 2007; Center 
for Advancement of Health, 2001, 2004; Hall, 2014; Neimeyer, 2014; Osterweis et al., 1984; 
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Stroebe et al., 2017; Rothpaut & Becker, 2007; Silver & Wortman, 1980, 2007; Weiner, 2007; 
Wortman & Silver, 1987, 1989, 1992). 
Chapter 1 Summary 
The posited loss-processing framework’s three components of perception, orientation, 
and direction (see Figure 1) may be useful in the assessment of numerous indicators of both 
positive and negative outcomes in the grief-health relationship. From this larger set of possible 
indicators, a provisional, perception-related subset was examined for this paper; however, future 
work could also benefit from the proposed modular framework, including with respect to 
indicators relating to its other two dimensions (orientation and direction). An accessible, 
interpretive approach with enhanced translational applicability may aid in streamlining grief 
research, thereby increasing the empirical evidence bases surrounding loss response, its possible 
interventions, and their efficacy. These include techniques to perhaps help prevent complications 
due to bereavement as well as methods to possibly reinforce grief’s beneficial aspects. As such, 
improving this empirical knowledge base should have the potential to positively impact grieving, 
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Chapter 2. Perception 
Perhaps the only way to overcome a traumatic severance of body and mind is to come 
back to the mind through the body. (Hartman, 2004, p. 541) 
The experience of living can change in response to the death of a loved one. Certain 
expectations regarding how the world does and does not work may no longer be met. Thus, life’s 
reality seems different; it may even feel unreal. As Butler (2003) notes: “…loss fractures 
representation itself” (p. 467), and as Davis (2001) has posited, responding to loss can often 
result in “severe threats to how people perceive themselves and how they perceive the world” (p. 
137). Similarly, Lindemann (1944/1994) concluded that in grief “the sensorium is generally 
somewhat altered” (p. 188). Since perceived sensory alterations are potentially a key component 
of loss response, an assumption of the proposed framework is that perceptual processes can seem 
to be impaired or are in some way(s) altered by grief. Even so, the precise mechanisms 
underlying possible changes in perceptual processing in response to loss are understudied. 
Likewise, and in part because changes in sensory perception in the context of grief are typically 
(assumed to be) transient, little is known about the possible permanence and/or the longer-term 
impacts of perceptual alterations in relationship to loss due to human death. 
The first dimension of the proposed loss-processing framework, perception, therefore 
primarily refers to the perceptual processing of sensorial information. This dimension (herein 
also alternately termed sense-making) encompasses the core functions of sensation (stimuli 
detection) and perception (organizing, identifying, and interpreting what has been detected) as 
well as the liminal space between them (see, e.g., Hochberg, 1956; Kolb, 2009; Schacter et al., 
2012). Possible changes to sensory processing in the context of loss may occur in the following 
related areas: 1) shock-like symptomatology; 2) intrasensory processing; 3) intersensory 
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processing (a.k.a., multimodal integration or intersensory coordination); 4) extrasensory 
processing (including hallucinations, illusions, and other post-death experiences of the decedent; 
dreams; threshold consciousness; and transliminality); and 5) time. 
Shock 
In summarizing Shontz’s (1965, 1975) crisis reaction theory, Silver and Wortman (1980) 
underscore that shock “…occurs to some degree in virtually every crisis state” (p. 287); Parkes 
(1970) views this “state of numbness…blunting, or shock” (p. 449) to be the most frequent 
immediate response to death (see also, e.g., Bowlby & Parkes, 1970; Eliot, 1943; Tyhurst, 1958). 
Similar to shock—as an acute reaction to (dis)stress (which is often crisis-related)—perceptual 
processing in the context of loss can also generally feature symptoms of anxiety, agitation, 
restlessness, fear, helplessness, confusion, dizziness, light-headedness, and/or faintness (for 
reference, see Summary of Diagnostic Features of Acute Stress Disorder [ASD], Appendix A, 
APA, 2013; for review see also Bryant et al., 2011). More specifically, clinical symptoms of 
dissociative acute stress reactions (ASR’s) may include a sense of numbing and/or detachment 
from emotional reactions; a sense of physical detachment, such as seeing oneself from another 
perspective; decreased awareness of one’s surroundings; the perception that one’s environment is 
unreal or dreamlike; and an inability to recall critical aspects of the stressful event (in this case 
death—or news of its imminence), which is also known as dissociative amnesia (APA, 2013; 
Bryant et al., 2011; Bryant & Harvey, 2000).  
Symptoms of acute dissociative reactions to stressful events are typically transient, 
beginning within one month following the event and lasting up to one month after onset. 
Duration may be longer, and/or onset more delayed, in the context of loss (APA, 2013). 
Additional symptoms include: “constriction of consciousness; depersonalization; derealization; 
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perceptual disturbances (e.g., time slowing, macropsia); micro-amnesias; transient stupor; and/or 
alterations in sensory-motor functioning, such as analgesia [and] paralysis” (APA, 2013, pp. 306-
307; see also Bryant et al., 2011; Bryant & Harvey, 2000; Kavan et al., 2012). With respect to 
two of these shock-related symptoms, Lindemann (1944/1994) notes exceptions to macropsia 
(with other people seeming shadowy and small rather than appearing larger) and analgesia 
(citing, e.g., evidence of specific somatic complaints, such as constriction of the throat and/or 
other respiratory problems) in loss contexts (see also, e.g., Goldstein, 2015). Regarding the latter, 
somatic complaints related to loss response may include symptoms that were experienced by the 
decedent prior to death (APA, 2013; see also, e.g., Parkes, 1970). 
Unlike shock, it should be noted that in some cases perceptual processing can seem to be 
in some way(s) enriched in response to loss. Although this felt acuity may bear some 
resemblance to sensitization in non-associative learning, in this context the sensitizing 
emphasizes awareness of, rather than reaction(s) to, stimuli relative to exposure to a sensory 
input (in this case one of significant loss). It also bears mentioning that over time certain 
individuals experiencing losses in this way may come to view perceptual processing as having 
been honed, intensified, or somehow enhanced by them. For example, following her older 
brother’s sudden death at the age of 40, Elizabeth Feldstein described her sensory perception as 
follows:  
“It’s like all of a sudden a pair of glasses were strapped to my face and I can’t take them 
off. Ever. And these glasses make me see the world differently than I did before. The 
colors bleed together more vividly. But they are somehow more than they ever were 
before. More visceral. More vibrant. More present. Simultaneously more awe-inspiring 
and more aching.”  (Deerwester, 2019, p.1) 
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It is also possible that features of sensory perception may alternate during loss response, perhaps 
tracking an oscillatory pattern similar to the one outlined in Stroebe and Schut’s (1999) dual 
process model (DPM) of coping in grief (see also Stroebe & Schut, 2001, 2010). 
Finally, with respect to shock-like symptoms and their relationship to perception in the 
context of loss, changes are not mutually exclusive; they may be neither discretely dulled nor 
sharpened, but could be differently altered instead. An example of this—albeit from an extreme 
circumstance of loss—is evinced in a soldier’s recounting of his sensory perception following 
the realization that his participation in drone warfare may have caused a civilian casualty (taking 
the life of a child). After making the drone strike, stepping out into the daylight of the desert 
landscape from the bunker where he was stationed, the soldier reported that “The light was too 
bright, and the dark places were too dark” (McEvers, 2013). It is therefore possible that in loss 
certain aspects of sensory perception may be exaggerated while others are simultaneously 
diminished. In this case the contrast of perceptual visual processing was heightened, while the 
ability to discern tacit colors and other nuanced visual detail was simultaneously lowered. 
Intrasensory Processing 
As indicated in some of the shock-like symptoms related to (dis)stress, the perception of 
each sense (or intrasensory processing) may be impacted by loss. In severe cases (e.g., in the 
context of brain injury, dementia, or nervous system illness) this has been termed agnosia (Greek 
for “lack of knowledge”), or “a neurological recognition deficit that affects a single [sensory] 
modality” (Burns, 2004, p.1; Freud, 1891/1953; Lissauer, 1890). First described by Finkelnburg 
(1870; for translation see Duffy & Liles, 1979) using the term asymbolia (the inability to 
understand previously familiar symbols), and also referred to as mindblindness (Munk, 
1881/1960), typically agnosia disturbs or disrupts one’s ability to understand, recognize, or 
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appreciate the identity or nature of sensory stimuli (e.g., sights, sounds, or somatosensations), but 
no specific sense is impaired—only its perception—and there is no significant memory loss (e.g., 
Joseph, 2018; Puente & Tonkonogy, 2009). Thus, agnosia reflects challenges in accurately 
assigning meaning to detected stimuli (Bauer, 2006); as Burns (2004) posits: those experiencing 
associative agnosia “perceive the stimuli but [are] unable to attach meaning to [it]” (p. 2). 
Here it should also be noted that an inaccurate overvaluing of the meaning of sensations 
in relationship to one another has been termed apophenia (Conrad, 1958; see also, e.g., Mishara, 
2010), and that delusional perceptions have been defined as instances where normal occurrences 
are perceived to have special meanings (see, e.g., Martin, 2015). That being said, for the 
purposes of this discussion, agnosia is used to refer to any/all perceptual meaning assignment 
disparities that possibly relate to or result from grief—including both under- and over-valuations. 
In general, grieving individuals have compared agnosia-like perception alterations to 
experiencing the world as if “in a fog” (e.g., Hodgson, 2016; Shear et al., 2011). This can even 
feel as though one’s sense of gravity has been altered; for example, as one daughter reported 
following her mother’s COVID-19-related death in April, 2020: “[I was] crying so hard that it 
actually hurt me. I couldn’t hold a thought. I was like, what the hell is wrong with me? Why do I 
feel so heavy?” (Fisher et al., 2020). More specifically, Lindemann (1944/1994) documented 
gustatory examples of agnosia-like symptoms surrounding loss in an inability to recognize or 
appreciate the taste of food, which one griever noted “tastes like sand” (p. 188). Or, as a grieving 
mother stated following the death of her 14-year-old daughter: “[I was] so shattered I could not 
see my own hand in front of my face” (Starr, 2012, p. 63). 
This is not limited to the senses of vestibulation, taste, or sight. For example, Alfred 
Wilson described his experience when receiving news of the sudden death of his friend and co-
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worker, Heather Heyer, as follows: “Everything was so quiet…like somebody had shut the 
volume control off on the world” (King, 2018). Similar examples may be found across the senses 
(e.g., sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. etc.), with variant subtypes categorized within the visual, 
auditory, and tactile senses (Bauer, 2006; Burns, 2004), as well as with respect to the perception 
of time. Time-perception-related agnosia in relationship to loss is covered at the end of this 
chapter. 
Agnosia can also be present in social-emotional perception; more broadly, this has been 
referred to as emotional, social(-emotional), or expressive agnosia (Joseph, 2018), which may be 
grief-influenced and “has only begun…to be described in a systematic manner” (Puente & 
Tonkonogy, 2009, p. 21). As related to loss, assessing possible agnosia-like misalignment(s) in 
emotional meaning assignation (e.g., with respect to anger, sadness, or other emotions) could be 
particularly salient. This may include with respect to gauging the emotional response(s) of others 
as well as of oneself (or alexithymia; see Sifneos, 1972, 1973). For example, a new type of 
agnosia, affective agnosia, has been described as “an impairment in the ability to mentally 
represent…what one is feeling” (Lane et al., 2015, p. 594)—which can apply in grief contexts.  
Finally, also noteworthy to the discussion of potential intrasensory alterations in grief is 
simultanagnosia, which refers to challenges in appreciating the overall meaning of a complex 
picture or stimulus—even though the perception of isolated details within the picture or stimulus 
is maintained (see, e.g., Coslett & Saffran, 1991). Although initially identified in relationship to 
vision, it could be beneficial to consider possible experiences of simultanagnosia in grief with 
respect to other sensory modalities (e.g., hearing, smell, taste, and touch); such a consideration 
hints at grief’s potential impacts on the sensorial assemblage requisite to intersensory processing, 
which is discussed in the next section. 
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Intersensory Processing 
Perception through intersensory processing is “something else than” (Koffka, 1935, p. 
176) the sum of its intrasensory perceptual processing modalities (e.g., vision, audition, 
olfaction, gustation, somatosensation, etc.). The dimensionality of sensory perception may thus 
be enhanced when understood in dynamic(al) systems theory (DST) terms. In a DST context, 
movement itself is considered to be a separate, additional perceptual system that is essential to 
multimodal integration and intersensory coordination. As Thelen and Smith (1994) assert, 
“…there is little or no learning or development that is strictly within modality” (p. 194), and 
“…intersensory coordination is the very mechanism of development—not a product, but the 
process through which intelligent commerce with the world is selected and maintained” (p. 192).  
Intersensory selection and maintenance processing may be temporarily affected or in 
some way(s) altered in relationship to loss. It is therefore possible that grief-related changes to 
the underlying coordination and integration mechanisms of multimodal perceptual processing 
point to a source of the “fog” (as noted in the previous section). For example, multisensory 
integration’s import to development is illustrated in the requisite collaboration of the perceptual 
processing modalities of vision, haptics, and audition (as well as the perception of time, balance, 
joint position, and muscle memory) in the integrated discernment of the body’s movement 
through (and orientation within) space, or proprioception—also sometimes known as kinesthesia 
or “movement sense” (see, e.g., Buonomano, 2017). As Wolbers and Hegarty (2010) note: 
“…spatial navigation is particularly complex because it is a multisensory process in which 
information needs to be integrated and manipulated over time and space” (p. 138). 
But what if one’s self-assessment of one’s perception of one’s own state of conscious 
awareness is considered to be uncertain, untrustworthy, or inaccurate (i.e., as if one is “in a 
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fog”)? As Freeman (1991) posits, “[Consciousness] enables the brain to plan and prepare for 
each subsequent action on the basis of past action, sensory input, and perceptual synthesis…. 
[Thus,] an act of perception…is a step in a trajectory by which brains grow, reorganize 
themselves, and reach into their environment to change it to their own advantage” (p. 85). When 
consciousness itself is in question (such as may be the case—even if only episodically, 
sporadically, or spasmodically—within a context of loss), then how might such an “advantage” 
be impacted: how might this growth or learning trajectory be altered? 
Extrasensory Processing 
Hallucinations 
In contrast to agnosia, when present stimuli are not fully or accurately perceived, 
hallucinations involve the perception of absent stimuli. Whereas both are recognition 
disturbances (Puente & Tonkonogy, 2009), agnosias are present absences and hallucinations are 
absent presences. Hallucinations of the decedent, when the deceased’s presence is (temporarily) 
sensed, felt, or perceived, have frequently been reported by those experiencing loss (e.g., 
Baethge, 2002; Sacks, 2012; see also Barbato et al., 1999; Conant, 1992, 1996; Cook & 
Dworkin, 1992; Grimby, 1993; Jung, 1969; Kalish & Reynolds, 1973; Marris, 1958/2004; Olson 
et al., 1985; Parkes, 1970, 1971; Rees, 1971a, b; for summary see Berger, 1995; Castelnovo et 
al., 2015; Cooper, 2017; Krippner, 2006; Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005; Nowatzki & Grant 
Kalischuk, 2009; Shear et al., 2011; Streit-Horn, 2011; Troyer, 2014). Datson and Marwit (1997) 
have concluded that these occurrences are frequent enough “to be considered a relatively normal 
correlate of bereavement” (p. 132). 
Hallucinations in bereavement and related phenomena have alternately been termed  
“post-death encounters or events” (PDE’s; Nowatzki & Grant Kalischuk, 2009), “after-death 
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communications” (ADC’s; Guggenheim & Guggenheim, 1995; Streit-Horn, 2011);  “post-death 
contacts” (Kalish & Reynolds, 1973, Klugman, 2006; Troyer, 2018), “sensing the presence” or 
“sense-of-presence” (Conant, 1992, 1996; Marris, 1958/2004; Simon-Buller et al., 1989; Rees 
1971a, b; Steffen & Coyle, 2010, 2011, 2012), “post-bereavement hallucinatory experiences” 
(Castelnovo et al., 2015),  “extraordinary experiences or encounters” (LaGrand, 2005; Parker, 
2005); “perceived presences of deceased loved ones” (Datson & Marwit, 1997), “hallucinatory 
wishful psychoses” (Freud, 1917/1957), “hauntings” (Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005) and 
“perceptual ‘sets’ of the lost person” (Parkes, 1970). Irrespective of terminological differences, 
these experiences: 1) are not accompanied by psychotic symptoms (e.g., Krippner, 2006; Troyer, 
2014); 2) are often considered indicators of the bereaved person’s absence-mindedness, or 
preoccupation and strong yearning to be with the person who died (e.g., Conant, 1992, 1996; 
Gilbert, 2006; Lindemann, 1944/1994; Parkes, 1970; Rando, 1988; Sacks, 2012; Schnell, 2004); 
and 3) are typically thought to be normal responses in the context of significant loss due to 
human death (Klass et al., 1996/2014; Worden, 2009; see also, e.g., Parkes, 1970; for summary 
see Datson & Marwit, 1997). 
PDE’s can involve auditory, visual, olfactory, tactile, and/or “sense of presence” 
perceptions of the decedent (Barbato et al., 1999). They may also have kinesthetic features, or 
“sensations such as falling or floating, sometimes experienced as out-of-body-experiences” 
(Soffer-Dudek & Shahar, 2009, p. 892). 
Baethge (2002) notes that grief (also alternately termed bereavement or post-
bereavement) hallucinations: 1) are normally present in only one sensory modality; 2) may 
persist for years or even decades; 3) are more often seen as comforting, but in rare instances may 
be viewed as stress-inducing (or even dangerous); and 4) “…probably comprise a heterogeneous 
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group of disturbances of perception and thought processes” (p. 296). Relatedly, bereavement 
hallucinations are often “deeply tied to emotional needs and feelings [and] tend to be 
unforgettable…” (Sacks, 2012, p. 233); for many, they can also be “comforting and [even] 
transformative” (Krippner, 2006, p. 176).  
The healthfulness of hallucinations surrounding loss—as well as their possible link to 
psychological distress—has been debated (e.g., Castelnovo et al., 2015; Hagman, 2001; Kamp et 
al., 2019; LaGrand, 2005; Parker, 2005; Pollock, 1987; Volkan, 1974; Volkan & Zintl, 
1993/2015; for summary see Datson & Marwit, 1997; Steffen & Coyle, 2012), but most often 
they are seen as having therapeutic utility (e.g., Cooper, 2017; Krippner, 2006; Nowatzki & 
Grant Kalischuk, 2009; Steffen & Coyle, 2010, 2011; Streit-Horn, 2011; Troyer, 2014). For 
example, Jayson Greene recounts experiencing the presence of his 2-year-old daughter, Greta—
some months after she died (when a loose brick fell from an 8th-story windowsill above her, 
striking her in the head)—as follows:  
She stepped out from behind a tree, and I was deeply aware that no one else could see her 
but me, but yet I ran over to her because it was so overwhelmingly real, and I picked her 
up, and she told me to go for my run. And so I ran into the park and tears were just 
coming down my face, and I got to the edge of the park, and that is where I wrote down 
this sentence: “There will be more light upon this earth for me.” (Neary, 2019; see also 
Greene, 2019, pp. 82-83)  
Terminology identifying survivor perceptions of the decedent post-death is often 
overlapping, with some researchers discriminating bereavement hallucinations from illusions—
which include instances where survivors report having sensed the “felt presence” of the decedent 
“…even in the absence of any visual, auditory, tactile, or olfactory perception” (Castelnovo et 
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al., 2015, p. 271; see also Baethge, 2002; Conant, 1992, 1996; Rees, 1971a, b). With respect to 
term differentiation, Conant (1996) notes that although “The vividness of the experience amazed 
[the widows interviewed],” and “The comparison to hallucinations was voiced spontaneously 
five times,” these widows emphasized that their experiences “were not hallucinations” (p. 186). 
Given their reluctance to apply this term, and its relationship to the possible 
stigmatization of those who report having had hallucinations (see, e.g., Barbato et al., 1999; 
Stevenson, 1983), Krippner (2006) stresses the importance of classifying these as “‘experiences’ 
(subjective verbal reports) [rather] than as ‘events’ (verifiable outcomes and activities)” (p. 177; 
for more regarding the discussion of controversial and/or sensitive phenomena, see also Glik, 
1992; Grimby, 1993; Streit-Horn, 2011; Zusne, 1985; Zusne & Jones, 1989/2014). As 
Castelnovo et al. (2015) have asserted, “…the [precise] phenomenological nature of these 
experiences remains elusive… ranging from hallucinations, pseudo-hallucinations, [and] 
illusions, [to] felt-presences” (p. 271). 
Oliver Sacks (2012) describes an additional type of grief-related illusion, one where 
bereaved individuals mistake, often fleetingly (perhaps at a distance and/or in a crowd), someone 
else for the person who died. He suspects his own illusory experiences of this sort were related to 
a state of “hyper-alertness [and] unconscious searching” (p. 231) for his mother over a period of 
months following her death, and contrasts these sorts of illusions with bereavement 
hallucinations—noting the following example, wherein Marion C., a psychoanalyst, recounts a 
(pseudo-) hallucinatory experience of her husband, Paul, after his death: 
One evening I came home from work as always to our big empty house…. Paul…greeted 
me in his familiar way: “‘Hello! You’re back! Hi!’ His voice was clear and strong and 
true; just the way it was when he was well. I ‘heard’ it…, I ‘saw’ him, I ‘saw’ the 
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expression on his face…, I ‘saw’ him greet me. That part was like one sees in a dream; as 
if I were seeing a picture or a movie of an event. But the speech was live and real. (p. 232)  
Although her recollection of the aural portion of the experience better meets hallucinatory criteria, 
Marion’s recounting of her visual memory as “like one sees in a dream” is more akin to sleep-
related sensory perceptions—including dreams—which are discussed in the next sections. 
Dreams 
Scientific understandings of why we dream vary considerably (Olsen et al., 2016), and 
theories regarding their purpose are wide-ranging, from “Jung’s…theory of dream function, a 
dynamic, open-system approach… to Freud’s mechanistic, drive-reduction model… sprinkled 
together with a Darwinian emphasis on adaptation as environmental mastery” (Dallett & Deese, 
1973, p. 408). Similarly, perspectives on dreams in the context of loss response are varied, 
including analyses of their content with respect to loss-related cognitive schemas for complicated 
grievers (Germain et al., 2013) as well as their (possible) therapeutic utility (see, e.g., Black et 
al., 2014; Cook & Dworkin, 1992; Garfield, 1996, 1997; Moss, 2005; Nicholson, 2016; Noronha, 
2014; Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005; Wray & Price, 2005; see also Parkes, 1970 on the role of 
dreams as part of an ongoing effort to recover a lost “object”—that of the relationship to a 
deceased loved one).  
For many, dream content in grief may focus on the survivor’s memories of—and/or their 
ongoing relationship with—the decedent. An example from Sobol (2017) is as follows: 
I dream that I press the button on the old telephone answering machine and I am 
surprised to hear my father's voice, saying my name, just the two syllables of my name 
but in a long, drawn-out, plaintive tone. I feel guilty and apprehensive—is he ok? Why 
have I forgotten to call him, it feels like an awfully long time—and I try to call him back 
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but I'm ashamed to realize I've forgotten the number. I go frantically rummaging through 
every drawer in the bedroom, and as I do I look at the furniture—the old bedroom suite 
that they got when they were first married, a chair from Pier One, the wall to wall carpet, 
bits and pieces left over from their lives that I know we will have to somehow dispose of, 
and somehow the button on the answering machine is pressed again and I hear my father 
leaving a long slightly surreal and inconsequentially rambling message that sounds 
something like, "Hello? Everybody? I'm here at this resort, and it's a last resort, and 
they're taking pretty good care of us, there's plenty to eat and they keep us entertained. It's 
like a cruise but we aren't going anywhere and it's comfortable enough but I miss our old 
friends. They keep us busy. Does anyone think about me? There's always things to read, 
and the weather's pretty good, and I will die some day. I just wanted to say hello. Bye bye 
for now." And the message machine issues its long conclusive beep, and I suddenly 
realize, oh yes—he really IS dead. And I wake up, alone in my bed, in Barry, in Wales, in 
September, 2017. He would have been 95 this month. RIP, Dad.  
My personal recollection of a dream about my maternal grandfather (Childress, 1992) 
features a conspicuous component of emotional expression:  
Last night I dreamt that I saw my grandfather for the first time since he died nearly 10 
years ago. I was with another man, perhaps not so old as my grandfather. I knew they 
were friends, and I knew that this man was taking me to see my grandfather. I also knew 
that my grandfather was dead, even in the dream. We were outside the funeral home 
where my grandfather used to work. The other man led me around the corner of the 
building and there he was. My grandfather greeted the other man and shook his hand. 
Then he turned slowly to me. Smiling, he said “Son.” I ran to him and embraced him. I 
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could feel the coarseness of his black wool suit, the chain of his pocket watch draped 
across his vest. I breathed in, smelling once again the shoe polish and starch, the hard 
soap and peppermint candy. To me this was the essence of all things old and wise…. I 
wept uncontrollably, more so than I did the day he died, at his funeral, or any time since. 
I sobbed into his coat, crying so loudly that I awoke from the dream…. Though he lived 
90 years this is all that I have…a glimpse in a dream eclipsed by the sheer joy of 
experiencing even that much. 
Others may perceive dreaming differently when grieving. For example, there are some 
individuals who report a sort of consciousness inversion surrounding a significant loss; in these 
cases reality is perceived more as a nightmare, one from which they are certain they will soon 
awaken. Larry Treadwell reported such an experience following the sudden death of his wife, 
Amanda: “I was convinced it was just a bad dream, and I argued with people…I was like, there's 
no way this is real. I'm gonna wake up here in a minute" (McEvers, 2017). Similarly, Parkes 
(1970) recounted the words of a recently widowed Londoner who stated: “I feel this is a different 
life…as if there’s another life going on somewhere else and I’ll wake up” (p.457). 
Musician Peter Gabriel (1998/2002) captures the interplay between dreaming and awake 
during grief somewhat differently in the lyric to his song I Grieve: “Did I dream this belief / Or 
did I believe this dream?” (from the album Up), and the novelist Donna Tartt (2013) describes a 
son’s (mostly) asleep experience of his dead mother as a “mysterious dream that felt more like a 
visitation” (p. 8). Such perceptions of dreams—how realistic they seem and their possible 
intrusion into waking life (see Solms, 1997/2014; for summary see also Domhoff, 2003)—may 
relate to threshold consciousness and transliminality (see subsequent sections). 
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Although interesting to consider in relationship to maladaptive grief (e.g., Germain et al., 
2013), for the purposes of the posited framework, dream content is mainly considered from a 
processing perspective—with particular emphasis on the possibility that “dreams [may] function 
to balance and complete waking consciousness” (Dallett & Deese, 1973, p. 408) or attempt “to 
restore through the unconscious what has not been satisfied in waking life” (Rochlin, 1965). This 
relates to the next category of perception, that of threshold consciousness, which has similarities 
with the perceptual processing of hallucinations as well (see previous section). 
Threshold Consciousness 
Often referred to as “half-asleep” (hypnagogia) or “half-awake” (hypnopompia), the 
transitional states of threshold consciousness can include the related mental phenomena of 
hallucinations, waking and/or lucid dreaming (see previous sections), and sleep paralysis (see, 
e.g., Mavromatis, 1987; Ohayon et al., 1996; Schacter & Hernstein, 1976; Sherwood, 2000). 
Hypnagogia refers to the transitional state of decreased wakefulness (Maury, 1848; Müller, 
1826/1967, 1848; see also Vihvelin, 1948), or “the drowsy interval between waking and 
sleeping” (Schacter & Hernstein, 1976, p. 452). Its mirror image, hypnopompia, is the state of 
consciousness leading out of sleep (Myers, 1903/1918). Hypnagogic and hypnopompic (H&H) 
hallucinations have been categorized as visual, auditory, and/or felt-presence (McCarthy-Jones et 
al., 2011), and primarily differ from hallucinations/PDE’s in that they do not occur in a state of 
(full) wakefulness (Waters et al., 2016).  
It should be noted that although the terms hypnagogia and hypnopompia are often 
conflated, they differ phenomenologically (Warren, 2007). Whereas a hypnagogic state is 
typically a rational cognition in wakefulness, focused on making sense of non-linear images and 
associations; hypnopompic states are more emotional and dream-like in nature, focusing on 
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sense-making in relation to real-world stolidity (Warren, 2007; Waters et al., 2016). Irrespective 
of their differences, disentangling these twilight states may sometimes be challenging, 
particularly in instances when sleep is briefly interrupted and subsequently re-instigated. In these 
situations, differentiation from remnants of dream imagery can also be difficult (see, e.g., Vaitl et 
al., 2005; Waters et al., 2016). 
 In the context of loss response, threshold consciousness phenomena are salient in several 
ways: 1) Response to loss may interfere in hypnagogic states, impairing their utility in enabling 
the onset of sleep and possibly resulting in sleep deprivation. 2) Similar to the previous section 
on dreams, the content of hallucinations/PDE’s (in this case during hypnagogic and 
hypnopompic states) may relate to the person who died. 3) The quality and duration of 
hypnopompic states bears additional scrutiny during loss response. This is evinced by the wave-
like realization—on/during awakening—of (remembering) the reality of the loss. As Bowler 
(2018) recounts after being diagnosed with cancer:   
Ever since the diagnosis, there has been a moment, in the minute between sleeping and 
waking, when I forget, when I have only a lingering sense that there is something that I 
am supposed to remember. In the warmth of my bed, I am caught in webs of dreams. And 
then there is the flood. I am dying. I am dying. I am dying. I am my son’s first goodbye.  
(p. 66)  
Moving from unconsciousness (during sleep) to consciousness (when awake), the felt 
magnitude of the impact of (re-)realizing the loss typically attenuates over time, and the duration 
of the (re)realization process usually contracts. The process can, however, contribute to the 
possible occurrence(s) of: sleep inertia, or “decreased performance and/or disorientation 
occurring immediately after awakening from sleep” (Tassi & Muzet, 2000, p. 341); para- and/or 
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dyssomnias (Waters et al., 2016); and other sleep-related disturbances (see, e.g., Chirinos et al., 
2019). It should also be noted that although the precise impacts of grief on dream quality are not 
precisely known (see previous section), it is possible that dream quantity suffers due to loss 
response’s negative impacts on sleep duration (due to interruption) by influencing the H&H 
states of threshold consciousness (for an assessment of the possible impacts of auditory/visual 
intrusive thoughts on H&H modalities, see, e.g., McCarthy-Jones et al., 2011). 
 Lastly, it must also be mentioned that for some grievers moments of threshold 
consciousness can be very meaningful. As John Bare (2020) recounted following his wife’s 
death: “During the night and early mornings, in the state between asleep and awake, Betsy and I 
still talk. In our bed, I reach over and rub her arm. I wake up stroking a pillow. I am grateful for 
these encounters” (p. 1).  
Transliminality 
Transliminality refers to “differences in the threshold at which unconscious processes or 
external stimuli enter into consciousness” (Fleck et al., 2008, p. 1353; see also Thalbourne & 
Houran, 2000; Thalbourne & Maltby, 2008). Anticipated by James (1902/1982), and for which 
there is a measurement scale (Lange et al., 2000), transliminality also relates to altered-
consciousness tendencies, which may include Watson’s (2001) construct sleep-related 
experiences (SRE’s). SRE’s encompass “…a variety of…altered-consciousness phenomena, 
such as nightmares, narcoleptic characteristics, recurring dreams, dream recall, vivid dreams, 
problem-solving dreams, [and] dreams confused with reality or ‘waking dreams’” (Soffer-Dudek 
& Shahar, 2009, p. 891). 
 Thus, transliminal experiences in the context of loss response refer to a range of possible 
grief-related changes in the interplay between unconscious and conscious sensory-perceptual 
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processing. As such, transliminality aptly summarizes both the challenge of discerning states of 
(un)consciousness in grief (as outlined above; note sections on dreams; hallucinations, PDE’s, 
and illusions; and threshold consciousness) and their possible relationship to an experience of 
enlightenment—what some have termed “magical thinking” (see, e.g., Krippner, 2006; Zusne, 
1985; Zusne & Jones, 1989/2014) or a “mystical state of consciousness” (Teasdale, 2019) 
surrounding loss (see also Didion, 2005). 
Time 
Previously noted above (in the section on shock) as a perceptual disturbance symptom of 
acute dissociative reactions to stressful events (APA, 2013)—as well as in the section on 
intrasensory processing—the perception of time (sometimes termed chronoception, perceived 
duration, or temporal awareness; e.g., Brown, 1985; Le Poidevin, 2011; Phillips, 2010; Prieto-
González et al., 2014) may feel altered in response to loss. These distortions have been referred 
to as temporal illusions (e.g., Allen & Gibbon, 1994; Nakajima et al., 1991). Although posited in 
DSM-5 (APA, 2013) as being experienced as slowing in the context of (dis)stress, agnosia-like 
changes to one’s sense of time during grief may also include its perceived acceleration and/or 
(perhaps more commonly) an inability to accurately gauge time’s passage at all, a disengagement 
from the tracking of it—what Greene (2019) describes as being “…in the time that is no time” 
(p. 16).  
For example, Neimeyer and Anderson (2002) note that “time itself seems to have 
shrunken” (p. 45) for Helen, 32, following the death of her infant daughter; as Helen states: “I 
have learned that we can’t live in the past, nor in the future…. We must only live in the present” 
(p. 46). Regarding potential negative impacts of these alterations, consider the known adverse 
effects of circadian clock misalignment(s), such as jet lag (e.g., McHill, 2020; Sack et al., 2007).  
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The import of a “time-locked” understanding of development’s construal in dynamic(al) 
systems theory (DST), where it is linked to the exact circumstances of “when” each experience 
occurs, should also be considered in relationship to loss. In DST, ontogenetic processes are a 
coordinated relationship between/among past experience(s) and current perceptual context 
(Thelen & Smith, 1994; Thelen & Ulrich, 1991). Developmental processing is therefore more 
about “through which” (an integrative and ongoing process) than it is about exactly “where” (a 
specified location or “seat of sensation” for sensory perception). Thus, within a DST framework 
one is not looking for a precise place where the developmental mechanism of 
sensation/perception resides, but more for a process that is “time-locked” to the exact 
circumstances of each moment of experience. In DST terms, then, every moment reveals the 
history of past experiences and contributes to the pattern of future ones (Thelen & Ulrich, 1991; 
see also Clark, 2013; Thelen & Smith, 1994); but what if time itself is perceived as being out of 
sync (also note previous discussion of intersensory information perception, above)? What are the 
possible (negative) developmental impacts of grief-related dyssynchrony? 
Buonomano (2017) asserts that there is no known, consolidating mechanism in the 
human brain for sensing/perceiving time: “Unlike vision or hearing, we do not have a sensory 
organ that detects time” (p. 21). Instead there are multiple “clocks” for different purposes. It is 
possible, then, that the exact circumstances of a death may exert particular influence on the 
perception of time vis-à-vis one or more of these clocks, depending on expectancies and other 
factors—such as when a child dies before a parent (typically a less-expected or “nonnormative” 
event [Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2002], and one often resulting in an outcome of more 
complicated bereavement [see, e.g., Craig, 1977; de Vries et al., 1997; Miles & Crandall, 1983; 
Rubin, 1993; Sanders, 1980]). That being said, little is known regarding the precise impact(s) of 
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loss response on the perception of time, such as whether or not the mind/body may have any sort 
of specific, built-in clock that is designated to in some way respond to and/or track time 
(differently) in relationship to the death of a significant other. 
Chapter 2 Summary 
For survivors, if the death of a loved one is viewed as the doorway between the 
experience of life prior to and then after loss, then grief is the threshold of this door. Perception 
at and around this threshold can seem unfamiliar, or even feel unreal, in multiple ways. For 
example, Jayson Greene (2019) describes waiting with family and friends at the hospital 
following his daughter’s tragic accident: “We know Greta is going to die…[and] glance around 
us, realizing this is the last we’ll ever see of the world as we’ve known it. Whatever comes next 
will raze everything to the ground” (p. 13); later, he describes her death as a “rip in the universe” 
(p. 77). Similarly, soon after his father died, Freud wrote of feeling “quite uprooted” (Freud et 
al., 1985, p. 202), and Grossman (2014) has posited that subsequent to a significant loss “…all 
that is will now echo what is not” (p. 51). Or, as K.T. Nicolaides recounted following the sudden 
death of her husband, Aaron: "I can feel around me that he's not here, and I know he's not 
coming back, but it's not quite real yet." (McEvers, 2017, emphasis added). And, finally, as 
described another way by Handler (1999): 
It is a curious thing, the death of a loved one. We all know that our time in this world is 
limited, and that eventually all of us will end up underneath some sheet, never to wake 
up. And yet it is always a surprise when it happens to someone we know. It is like 
walking up the stairs to your bedroom in the dark, and thinking there is one more stair 
than there is. Your foot falls down, through the air, and there is a sickly moment of dark 
surprise as you try and readjust the way you thought of things. (pp. 96-97) 
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In responding to loss, this “moment of dark surprise” can sometimes seem to feel both 
magnified and protracted. It may be more akin to (but not necessarily exactly like) the queasy, 
kinesthetic sensation felt when descending rapidly in an elevator, except in this case the floor of 
destination is not known; thus, the duration of the sense of unease is likewise indeterminate.  
Such alterations in perception may relate to what leads many grieving individuals to later 
report that they thought they were “going crazy” or “losing their minds” (e.g., Cook & Dworkin, 
1992; DeFrain, 1991; Rando, 1988; see also Didion, 2005). Although likely operating along a 
continuum (from less to more severe symptomatology), and/or possibly oscillating in a wave-like 
pattern (more similar to DPM; see Stroebe & Schut, 1999, 2001, 2010), this feeling of psychosis, 
of a marked departure from reality or “life circumstance that ruptures one’s previous ability to 
make sense of the world” (Schwartzberg, 1993, p. 489), has in this chapter been addressed at the 
fundamental level of sensorial interpretation or perception.  
As a thresholding experience (designating the liminal space between the reality with—
and then the reality without—the prospect of again encountering the actual embodied presence of 
the person who has died), response to loss may involve multiple (re)adjustments to how the 
world is perceived and experienced. For example, Greene (2019) notes that “…time passes 
mostly soundlessly. There are days when I am confused, panicked, like I’ve woken up in a dark 
room with unfamiliar contours” (p. 73). Sensing what is real and what is not; what is conscious 
awareness and what is not; what are dreams, hallucinations, or illusions and what are not; what is 
recognizable and what is not; what is asleep and what is awake; what is present and what is 
absent; even what is time and knowing how much time has elapsed: all of these processes are 
potentially impacted in response to loss. There can also be emergent alterations in the gradations 
of how what “is” is experienced with respect to perceptual processing during grief, with some 
 39 
perceptions seeming to be more or less valued in terms of the meaning(s) assigned to them than 
was the case before the loss occurred; these changes, for example, may include agnosia-like grief 
symptoms in intrasensory and affective perception.  
Though of uncertain sufficiency, visuospatial dysgnosia—the loss of a sense of “where-
ness” in the relationship between oneself and one’s environment “…and in the relation of objects 
to each other” (Cogan, 1979, p. 367)—is perhaps an apt term to more generally summarize these 
possible changes in perceptual perspective when grieving. This relates to topographical 
disorientation, or difficulty finding one’s way in the environment (Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1999; 
Habib & Sirigu, 1987), which is the topic of the next chapter, orientation. 
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Chapter 3. Orientation 
In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty…. (Freud, 1917/1957, p. 
245) 
The collaboration of experience and context in (re)connecting the grieving individual to 
their environment, now in the absence rather than in the physical presence of their loved one, is 
herein referred to as orientation. As noted in the previous chapter, the perception of time and 
space—including the stimuli therein, and the rudimentary navigation thereof—can seem 
unfamiliar (or even feel permanently altered) following significant loss. Whereas the last chapter 
on perception emphasized sensory perceptual processing in grief, this chapter emphasizes 
perspectives developed, at least in part, through those sensory perceptions across space and time. 
The contextual absence resulting from significant loss is such that survivor perspectives on how 
to orient themselves within and to navigate previously familiar experiences, as well as new ones, 
may now seem challenging—or (at a minimum) can feel quite different.  
Often linked to visuospatial dysgnosia (or the loss of a sense of “whereness” relative to 
oneself and one’s surroundings, as well as with respect to the relationship of objects to each 
other; Cogan, 1979), an inability to orient oneself to one’s environment has also been termed 
topographical disorientation (a.k.a., topographical agnosia or topographagnosia). This chapter 
relates more to the latter, topographical disorientation (Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1999; Habib & 
Sirigu, 1987), which is normally the result of focal brain injury. For the purposes of this 
discussion, however, its etiology is traced to the impact(s) of loss, its symptomatological 
ramifications are usually much less severe, and they typically attenuate over time. 
Following the death of a significant other, a new sense of orientation or post-loss 
worldview is redeveloped. This redevelopment process progressively “emerges from the 
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cooperative interactions of multiple components within a facilitating context” (Thelen & Ulrich, 
1991, p. v); these include: 1) what is perceived; 2) the contextual salience of when, where, and 
how this perception occurs; and 3) how similar, related, or other relevant perceptions may have 
been experienced in the past. As Titelman et al. (2011) posit: “Immediate experience is seen as a 
domain in which [a] fusion of the present and the past as well as the organization of human 
experience takes place” (p. 296). This fusion, which is continuously updated, is an emergent 
(re)mapped perspective of the grieving individual’s relationship to their environment. 
Orientation is perhaps better understood, then, in dynamic(al) systems theory (DST) 
terms (Thelen, 1992; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Thelen & Ulrich, 1991; for brief summary see also 
Dixon, 2015): “where” the griever “is” (their situatedness) is redeveloped within the context of 
significant loss. This process occurs relationally, is collaborative, and “develops from the 
confluence of many participating elements” (Thelen & Ulrich, 1991, p. vi). Now, in a context 
that is absent their loved one, a sense of “where” the griever “is” must be reconstrued through the 
experience of movement through time/space, a perception-action loop in DST terms (Thelen & 
Smith, 1994; Thelen & Ulrich, 1991). For those experiencing significant loss, this loop may need 
recalibrating. Thus, the way is in the finding. 
Learning therefore occurs “…by perceptually exploring the world” (Thelen & Smith, 
1994, p. 170). As Attig (2001) has asserted: “…grieving involves nothing less than relearning the 
world of our experience” (p. 33). Just as sensation is typically considered essential to perception, 
way-finding (how individuals find their bearings and begin again to navigate their environments) 
is integral to orientation. That being said, here it is important to recall the relationship between 
orientation and perception: in grief, possible changes to the latter (as outlined in Chapter 2, on 
perception/sense-making) can be challenging to orientation/way-finding—and vice-versa. 
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Alterations in way-finding during loss response are illustrated in allocentric (object to 
object) and egocentric (self-to-object) spatial coding systems (see Figure 2). Often the decedent 
would have been pivotal to each of these coding systems, as well as to their integration. 
Figure 2  
Allocentric and Egocentric Spatial Coding Systems 
 
Note. See Mental Imagery and Human-Computer Interaction Lab (2021) 
The integration of allocentric and egocentric perspectives echoes the prior discussion of 
macropsia (also known as megalopia) in the previous chapter. Macropsia, one of the shock-like 
symptoms impacting sensory processing, is a neurological condition influencing visual perception. 
In general, with macropsia objects in the visual field seem larger than normal. This may cause the 
perceiver to feel smaller than in actuality. Specifically in the context of loss, however, Lindemann 
(1944/1994) notes an alternate report of micropsia-like symptoms, wherein objects appear smaller 
than normal; thus, the person may feel larger than is actually the case. 
In and through loss, how these “dualing” or bi-fold perspectives of macro/micropsia are 
reconciled may relate to the integration of allocentric and egocentric spatial coding systems. 
Surrounding the loss of a significant other due to death, a previously prominent point of 
reference or landmark is now absent; in this absence spatial interpretation can be(come) (more) 
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complicated, particularly with regard to gauging distance—which is also pivotal in order to 
accurately interpret the size of objects and/or of individuals within the visual field. Grieving 
individuals may therefore feel orientationally challenged in this unfamiliar environment. 
As an illustration, consider the immediate, felt impacts of experiencing a world absent 
virtually all important, known landmarks, such as is the case in the world’s largest salt flat (the 
Salar de Uyuni, in southwestern Bolivia). A prehistoric lake (now a massive layer of salt crust 
which sits two miles above sea level and covers approximately 4,000 square miles) the Salar has 
been described as “one of the most savage and surreal destinations on earth” (Frank, 2014, p. 1). 
[It is also the location where the final battle sequence in Star Wars: The Last Jedi (Johnson, 
2017) was filmed.]  This vast, void landscape enables what would otherwise be thought of as 
“trick” photographic methods (e.g., telephoto lenses), but in the Salar no tricks are needed. The 
absence of access to immediately interpretable visual information (at the horizon and otherwise) 
makes precise spatial discernment difficult; people and objects can easily seem larger and/or 
smaller than they actually are (see photographs in Figure 3). Judging the distance between 
objects is likewise challenging, which also negatively impacts the interpretation of how much 
time it takes to traverse the landscape from one point to another. 
Figure 3  
Two “Challenging” Perspectives from the Salar de Uyuni, Bolivia 
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Typically taken in jest (and generally interpretable with accuracy after a moment’s 
pause), these photographs are obviously not included here as precise representations of what it 
may or may not exactly be like to experience the world through the lens of loss. However, the 
surreal nature of such images hints at the challenges that might be involved in (re)calibrating and 
subsequently navigating one’s environment after the loss of a significant other. Orientation and 
navigation are harder in the absence of important landmarks (Van der Ham et al., 2017), such as 
may be the case following the loss of a loved one. These situations could be similar to the 
navigational impairment experienced by those with landmark agnosia, or an inability to 
recognize salient environmental stimuli (Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1999; Van der Ham et al., 2017). 
Not only can the sense of “where-ness” seem to be altered in grief (similar to visuospatial 
dysgnosia), but “when-ness” surrounding loss may also feel changed (similar to 
dyschronometria—and possibly exacerbating topographical disorientation). Perspectives on 
motion and speed, on knowing how much time it should/will take to get from one place to 
another, are difficult to gauge when information regarding the distance between objects is either 
not clearly evident or is considered to possibly be untrustworthy. Additional data points are 
needed for more accurate spatial and temporal interpolation. The resulting uncertainness may 
serve to influence one’s sense of the passage of time in general—even in the absence of 
movement through space, but also with respect to movement through spaces previously 
considered familiar (see also section on time at the end of the previous chapter on perception).  
An additional example is available by way of a tool that is indispensable in the Salar de 
Uyuni, Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation (see, e.g., Grewal et al., 2007). Given the 
wide availability of these technological tools today, including in many vehicles and smartphone 
apps, GPS navigation software is now a familiar and accessible aid to guide drivers/travelers 
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between and among locations. As was the case with the Salar de Uyuni depiction above, it must 
be noted that the following GPS illustration is intended to be analogous—but is by no means 
necessarily equivalent—to how it may feel to orient oneself within and begin to navigate one’s 
world following on loss. 
Using satellite-based information to interpolate exact location/direction, GPS 
navigational guidance is typically interfaced from an egocentric orientation (i.e., from the 
“driver’s” perspective). Landmarks are not always provided, and the “navigator” (or voice 
thereof) advises the driver through the provision of basic directional instructions (e.g., “in 500 
feet turn left onto Smith Boulevard…”). On-screen visuals may be available, but often these may 
include only rudimentary information, similar to that which is provided audibly. 
Thus, albeit enabling, at best navigation with GPS can still feel somewhat constricting. 
Although landmarks are sometimes absent or missing, with patient persistence it is usually 
possible to reach one’s desired destination. At worst, however, grief can be thought of as 
potentially altering GPS navigation; it can seem as if the satellite signal (needed for determining 
position and enabling navigation) is unavailable or intermittent, important landmarks may be 
missing, and key roads are either permanently closed or are suddenly under construction. In this 
sense, it can seem as though loss leads to lost. 
There may be times, for example, when the driver (in this case the griever) is slow in 
responding, and is unable to make a turn in time—as directed by the GPS software. This can feel 
similar to instances when the navigator provides allocentric rather than egocentric information 
(e.g., “go northwest on Smith Boulevard,” rather than “turn left…”), which may be 
uninterpretable. [Interestingly, most GPS navigation systems technically differ from compasses: 
with GPS, movement is typically required to accurately determine location/direction.] Or, in the 
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context of grief, the navigator may seem to be suddenly, inexplicably speaking in a British rather 
than North American dialect (or vice-versa), or seemingly be speaking in another language 
altogether. In GPS-terms, these grief-related complicating factors may result in the navigation 
device’s repeated refrain of “recalculating” and/or “make a U-turn as soon as possible.” Of 
course, the recalculating may never resolve and/or the U-turn(s) may in the end be unhelpful, 
making it sometimes seem as though the griever is “driving in circles.”  
Estimated arrival times must likewise be recalculated, and—irrespective of actual trip 
duration—on arrival it can seem like it took longer. The driver/griever may feel weary from what 
once was an inconsequential journey, or the destination may simply be unreachable (at least for 
the time being). As Jayson Greene (2019) recounted following on his young daughter Greta’s 
death: “I only have to close my eyes and peer inside to find the repaved roads, the hazard cones 
and blocked-off exits…” (p. 229). In short, with loss-impacted GPS navigation the griever can 
sometimes (still) feel lost. 
Several caveats are noteworthy here: 1) As mentioned in the previous chapter on 
perception, in some circumstances (certain aspects of) the grieving individual’s sense of 
orientation may seem to be enhanced following a loss. For example, this can be the case after 
situations of a protracted and/or painful terminal illness, wherein relief from the (dis)stress(es) of 
caregiving seems to improve the griever’s sense of orientation (i.e., “a weight has been lifted”). 
2) It is possible that encountering objects or spaces associated with a deceased loved one may 
serve to scramble a survivor’s perspective of the post-loss environment, often by prompting 
intense remembering or “flooding.” Greene (2019) terms these objects the “physical facts of [the 
decedent’s] life” (p. 36), and the experience of such spaces as being one of “terminal stillness” 
(p. 50); after his daughter died, he noted: “Everywhere I look, I am blinded by her” (p. 55). And 
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3) Although it is tempting to make more obvious analogous connections (which can be helpful), 
viewing the decedent’s post-loss navigational role should also be considered in more complex 
ways. For example, whereas thinking of the loss as “losing satellite signal” (which is essential to 
orientation and navigation) can be useful, it is not the only way to consider it. It could be more 
like a previously pivotal landmark is now missing; or, alternately, it may be worthwhile to think 
of loss as having closed certain routes that were previously available but are now under 
construction—or are perhaps now permanently closed. This is reflected in the allocentric and 
egocentric spatial coding systems model: viewing the deceased as having been an integral 
“object” in the allocentric perspective (which is now missing) is not necessarily complete. The 
person who died may be a key part of the survivor’s sense of identity from an egocentric 
viewpoint as well. Also, the decedent may or may not still be allocentrically represented as an 
illusion, hallucination, or other post-death experience (PDE), and may be reflected in memory-
laden physical objects and spaces (see, e.g., #2 above).  
Furthermore, it must be noted that the use of the GPS navigation analogy for 
understanding orientation/way-finding surrounding loss should not be limited to spatial and 
temporal contexts. Just as there are social and emotional understandings of agnosia with respect 
to perception, these components (as well as behavioral aspects) are potentially important and 
should be considered with respect to orientation. For example, possible challenges and/or 
changes following loss may leave survivors feeling socially and emotionally isolated or 
otherwise unmoored. Navigating interactions at these intersections can be more difficult, and 
possibly even more important, than physical locational way-finding. Of course, it also bears 
noting that some social and emotional connections can be, and often are, enhanced following a 
significant loss due to human death. 
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Chapter 3 Summary 
 Returning to the threshold metaphor from the previous chapter summary (viewing the 
death of a loved one as a doorway between the experience of life before and after loss, with grief 
as the threshold of this door), not only can perceptions at this threshold seem unfamiliar, or even 
unreal, but perspectives on the post-loss world from this threshold may also feel disorientingly 
different. This chapter has therefore focused on orientation, which generally refers to the 
collaborative way-finding processing of experience that occurs as grieving individuals (re)adjust 
to and (re)acquire knowledge about the environment just beyond—and then further outside—the 
range of their more immediate sensory perception.  
More specifically, orientation designates possible shifts in perspective that can initially 
result in an inability to accurately discern size (e.g., macro/micropsia). These shifts (may) relate 
to ego/allocentric frames of reference, with landmarks being essential to both in order for 
grieving individuals to appropriately interpolate distance(s) and subsequently “(re)map” or “find 
their bearings” in a post-loss environment—both spatially and temporally. 
The physical absence of their loved one can make the way-finding requisite to this 
(re)mapping challenging. As Parkes (1970) notes: “Grief…is a complex and time-consuming 
process in which a person gradually changes their view of the world and the places and habits by 
means of which they orientate and relate to it” (p. 465). It may be helpful to liken the processing 
involved to a loss-impacted GPS navigation system, one wherein the user must re-learn routes 
(from an egocentric perspective) in order to (re)establish important landmarks (part of an 
allocentric perspective) and subsequently (re)develop an integrated, functional, map-like 
representation of their environment (what has been termed an exocentric perspective). In 
exocentric space, “…spatial relations between objects within the environment, including the 
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observer, are emphasized” (Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1999, p. 1614, italics added; see also Taylor 
& Tversky, 1992).  
The construal of this new, post-loss map of the world (or orientation) is not limited to 
physical dimensionality (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Tolman, 1948), but can include social 
(Jameson, 1988), emotional (Flatley, 2008), and behavioral (Ittelson et al., 1970) dimensions as 
well. That being said, having (access to) a map and going somewhere are not the same: it is one 
thing for someone to have an idea of where one is, and another to have a sense of where one 
might want to go. Put another way, orientation is more like a frame of reference than a point of 




Chapter 4. Direction 
When we are no longer able to change a situation…we are challenged to change 
ourselves. (Frankl, 1946/1984, p. 135)  
Similar to meaning (re)construction in existing grief theory (e.g., Gillies & Neimeyer, 
2006; Neimeyer, 2001a)—which has also been termed meaning(-)making (e.g., Neimeyer, 2005; 
Uren & Wastell, 2002)—direction herein refers to post-loss processing that seeks, with the 
prospect of finding, something positive and purposeful through grief. Meaning-making in loss 
has previously been operationalized to include one or more of the following facets: making sense 
of the loss, benefit-finding, identity change, purpose in life, and life significance (see, e.g., 
Hibberd, 2013; Nadeau, 2008; for additional summary, including alternate terminology and other 
meaning-making mechanisms, see also Park, 2010, 2013).  
As its operationalization with respect to meaning-making’s positive potential implies, 
here the underlying mechanism of direction is termed perspective-seeking, which is analogous to 
course-charting. Although technically any direction (with a negatively-, benignly-, or positively-
interpreted course) may be charted, with perspective-seeking the direction is viewed as being 
positively-valenced, since “perspective” often connotes an enhanced understanding, and what is 
“sought” is typically considered desirable. Perspective-seeking therefore denotes the 
multifaceted ways through which the loss of a loved one (a stressful event known to possibly 
have adverse effects) may be construed as leading toward—and perhaps even aiding in—the 
creation of positive meaning and sense of purpose after loss. 
In addition, it may be helpful to view the first two components (perception and 
orientation) as the X and Y axes of the loss-processing framework, with the third or Z axis being 
that of direction. If perception and orientation represent a two-dimensional or cartographical 
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understanding of grief, then direction adds the third topographical (or “depth”) dimension (see 
Figure 4). Whereas perception and orientation are indicative of where the grieving individual is 
located, direction refers to what it is like there: how the bereaved person is experiencing the 
environment in that precise location—including their stance/posture within it and their outlook 
on the world from that vantage point. Do they view being there as having any potential for 
positive, purposeful, directed movement following the loss or not? Put another way, what is their 
post-loss sense of direction? Perspective-seeking potentiates this sense of direction. 
Figure 4 
Topographical Perceptual Space in the Loss-Processing Framework 
 
Understood in this manner, direction with perspective-seeking does not necessarily 
require a specified destination but indicates more of an attitude toward the (relative) desirability 
(given the circumstances) of where one is (or how one finds oneself there) and whether or not 
embarking on any sort of trip (literally or figuratively) might be welcomed—either at present or 
in the future. Direction with perspective-seeking is therefore more akin to the conative trajectory 
of a journey than the definitive destination of a quest. As such, it can possibly influence 
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processing relative to perception and/or orientation, and vice-versa. This renders the three axes, 
respectively, as being more perceptual, orientational, and motivational in nature. 
Through perspective-seeking, then—and as previously operationalized in the meaning 
(re)construction/meaning-making literature in the context of loss—there are at least 5 possible 
pathways toward a meaningful, positive trajectory following the death of a significant other:      
1) making sense of the loss through (an) explanation(s) of why it happened; 2) benefit-finding: 
the identification of “silver linings” as a result of the loss; 3) identity change: a new and 
improved view of oneself following loss; 4) purpose in life: finding reasons to live after losing a 
loved one; and 5) life significance: assigning value to goals, relationships, and aspects of life in 
the present and future after a loss (for summary see Hibberd, 2013; Park, 2010, 2013).  
Given extant documentation with respect to meaning (re)construction/meaning-making, 
including empirical support thereof (see, e.g., Davis et al., 1998; Hibberd, 2013; see also Davis, 
2001; Gillies & Neimeyer, 2006; Neimeyer, 2001a, 2015b; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2002; 
Park, 2010, 2013), this discussion will focus on commonalities among these five pathways and 
other perhaps-related mechanisms with possible positive potential following loss (e.g., resilience, 
religiousness, spirituality, sense of coherence, forgiveness, and self-compassion) as well as 
challenges to them. Key to what is common among them, and to what is commonly challenging 
to each of them, is the concept of reconciling. 
Reconciling 
When the unimaginable occurs (such as is often the case following the death of a loved 
one), how does one feel/think/act in response to it, and where does that feeling/thinking/acting 
lead? Perhaps more important (or at least as much so), does how one feels/thinks/acts about the 
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loss make a difference with respect to where one’s feeling/thinking/acting leads (e.g., toward 
more or less adaptability going forward)? 
In the context of grief, reconciling is herein defined as the ongoing processing of an 
encounter with what may seem unencounterable, between what was and what is now no longer, 
or the moment-to-moment engagement with the reality of significant loss due to human death. 
As Shwartzberg (1992) notes, with loss “…old beliefs about how the world functions are no 
longer valid; reality is no longer what it was” (p. 427). Here Worden’s (2009) first task of 
mourning, “accepting the reality of the loss” should be noted—see also Kübler-Ross and 
Kessler’s (2005) “acknowledging the reality of the loss” (adapted from Kübler-Ross, 1969; as 
summarized in Kessler, 2019), Rando’s (1984, 1993) first of six “R” processes of mourning: 
“recognizing the loss”, as well as Freud’s (1917/1957) and Klein’s (1940) focus on “reality 
testing.” It also bears mentioning that this ongoing relationship to loss may track an oscillatory 
course toward adaptation (or, put differently, toward adaptiveness; see next paragraph), such as 
is posited in Stroebe and Schut’s (1999) dual process model (DPM) of coping with bereavement, 
wherein the griever oscillates between loss- and restoration-oriented coping activities—or 
between one of these and not coping at all (see also Stroebe & Schut, 2001, 2010). 
What is perhaps more noteworthy to the current discussion, though, is that in the loss-
processing framework reconciling is used instead of resolution, restoration, or even 
reconciliation, terms implying recovery from grief—that there is “closure,” i.e., an end-point or 
specified terminus for the grieving process (e.g., Archer, 2001, 2008; Freud, 1916/1957, 
1917/1957; Parkes & Weiss, 1983; Stroebe & Schut, 1999; Volkan & Zintl, 1993/2015; for a less 
time-delimited elaboration on Freud, see Clewell, 2004; for further discussion, see also Pearce, 
2018; Schwartzberg, 1992; Shapiro, 1996, 2001; Wolfelt, 1987; Woodward, 1990, 1993). When 
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reconciling is perspective-seeking in nature, it is assumed to lead toward more creative and 
adaptively-patterned feelings, thoughts, and actions over time (i.e., more toward adaptiveness 
than adaptation—more toward growth than fit; see, e.g., Pike et al., 2010); thus, it is considered 
to be leading in a positive direction, but does not have to lead toward a precise destination—and 
it is ongoing (e.g., Attig, 2010/1996; Barthes, 1981; Cook & Dworkin, 1992; Eng & Kazanjian, 
2003; Gaines, 1997; Hagman, 2001; McCabe, 2003; Pollock, 1981, 1987, 1989a; Schwartzberg, 
1992; White, 2015; Woodward, 1990, 1993). For the purposes of this discussion, any/all 
reconciling that is not perspective-seeking in nature is not assumed to necessarily lead in a 
negative direction, or toward any particular diagnostically maladaptive destination (e.g., 
Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder or PCBD [APA, 2013] or Prolonged Grief Disorder 
[World Health Organization, 2018b; see also Maercker et al., 2013; Maercker & Lalor, 2012; 
Prigerson et al., 2009]). 
Regrettably, a discussion of reconciling in relationship to meaning (re)construction vis-à-
vis direction/perspective-seeking does not fully address how “meaning” (also alternately termed 
“meaningfulness,” “meaning in life,” and “will-to-meaning”) is exactly defined (for various 
perspectives, see, e.g., Davis  et al., 1998; Frankl, 1946/1984, 1955/1965; 1969/1988; Gillies & 
Neimeyer, 2006; Hibberd, 2013; Holland et al., 2006; Klinger, 1977, 1998; Lichtenthal et al., 
2010; Nadeau, 2008; Neimeyer, 2000a, 2001a, 2006; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2002; Park, 
2010, 2013; Thompson & Janigian, 1988; Uren & Wastell, 2002). Baumeister (1991) defined 
meaning as “…shared mental representations of possible relationships among things, events, and 
relationships,” further stating that “…meaning connects things” while also noting that defining 
meaning is perhaps challenging because “…to define meaning is already to use it” (p. 15). 
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As Hibberd (2013) further elaborates: “the terms meaning reconstruction and meaning-
making [herein jointly termed perspective-seeking]… refer to the process of mourners’ efforts to 
find or construct meaning however it may be defined; meaning will be used as a shorthand for 
the sociocultural, cognitive, and/or affective schemas, narratives, experiences, or values so 
constructed” (p. 672; see also Davis et al., 1998; Neimeyer, 2001a; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 
2002; Park, 2010, 2013). In other words, precisely what “meaning” means in the context of loss 
may be of less import than that it is made—and how (see, e.g., Kessler, 2019). Here I would also 
add that perspective-seeking does not necessarily have to be effortful, or at least it is perhaps best 
for it not to be framed as such—so as to avoid being (mis)interpreted (exclusively) as “work” (or 
trauerarbeit, Freud, 1917/1957; see also Lindemann, 1944/1994), or as a (set of) specified 
“task(s)” (see, e.g., Gaines, 1997; Worden, 2009). 
For the purposes of this discourse, then, suffice it to say that reconciling may lead in 
multiple directions—positive, negative, and otherwise (i.e., in no particular direction at all). 
Through perspective-seeking the direction is considered to be positive (i.e., toward 
adaptiveness), and the trajectories or mechanisms of perspective-seeking are construed as being 
similar to those of meaning (re)construction or meaning-making. These include, but are not 
limited to, the aforementioned five pathways: making sense of the loss, benefit-finding, identity 
change, purpose in life, and life significance (for summary see, e.g., Hibberd, 2013; see also 
Park, 2010, 2013). A brief explication of each of these is as follows. 
Perspective-Seeking 
“The concept of meaning in the social sciences is, of course, a notoriously treacherous 
one” (Entrikin, 1991, p. 19); as Gipe (2019) has asserted: “…meaning is complex and shifting 
and difficult to state…” (p. 318). Much research in the field of meaning(-making) has been 
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conducted more broadly than within the specific context of loss or trauma (for summary see 
Baumeister, 1991; McDonald et al., 2012; Proulx et al., 2013; Wong, 2012, 2017; Wong & Fry, 
1998a, b). For example, Dittmann-Kohli (1991) emphasizes the link between meaning and 
functioning, stating that meaning “…is a cognitive map that orients the individual in steering 
through the life course…” (as cited in McDonald et al., 2012, p. 358; Wong & Fry, 1998b, p. 
368), and the construct’s original proponent, Viktor Frankl (1946/1984, 1955/1965, 1969/1988), 
has underscored the ubiquity of meaning’s motivational dimension. In addition, Zittoun et al., 
(2008) have noted that in responding to a perceived significant break or rupture in one’s ordinary 
experience, individuals typically “seek to make meaning—engaging in representational labor and 
in efforts to regulate and integrate emotional and unconscious responses” (p. 164; see also 
Zittoun et al., 2003).  
Specifically with respect to grief, Neimeyer (1998) posits that “…meaning reconstruction 
in response to a loss is the central process in grieving” (p. 110; 2001a, p. 4; see also, e.g., Gillies 
& Neimeyer, 2006; Neimeyer, 2000a, 2005, 2015a, 2016), further delineating meaning 
reconstruction following loss as a dynamic process spanning multiple levels of awareness—from 
overt, conscious beliefs to the more subtle, deeper mechanisms utilized in construing complex 
perceptions of the world and self (Neimeyer, 2000b, 2001a). Gillies and Neimeyer (2006) 
articulate three perspective-seeking pathways (which they term contexts of meaning; see also 
Currier et al., 2008; Neimeyer & Anderson, 2002) through grief: making sense of the loss, 
benefit-finding, and identity change. 
Making Sense of the Loss 
Making sense has been more broadly been defined as “a motivated, continuous effort to 
understand connections (which can be among people, places, [thoughts, feelings,] and events) in 
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order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively” (Klein et al., 2006, p. 71). Specifically 
within the context of grief, making sense of the loss designates “both the process of searching for 
understanding post-loss and the outcome of the searching process at any given moment in time” 
(Currier et al., 2006, p. 404). As such, making sense of the loss is the ongoing development of 
interpretations/explanations regarding the comprehensibility of stress-related (and typically 
stress-inducing) adverse events—in this case due to loss as a result of human death. These 
explanatory or interpretive construals may rely on existing assumptive schemas (Janoff-Bulman, 
1989; Parkes, 1971, 1975)—also known as “senses” or “structures of meaning” (Frankl, 
1946/1984; Marris, 1974; Yalom & Lieberman, 1991)—which are “often framed in 
philosophical or spiritual terms” (Holland et al., 2006, p. 176; see also Wortman et al., 1993). 
Meaning-making through making sense of the loss typically involves an explanation of why the 
loss may have occurred in one of two ways: 1) in terms consistent with an individual’s pre-
existing worldview; or 2) by modifying the survivor’s worldview in order to accommodate the 
reality of the loss (Wortman et al., 1993). 
Benefit-Finding 
Whereas making sense of the loss relates more to explaining “…how a particular event 
fits into one’s conception of how the world is assumed to work” (Davis et al., 1998, p. 562), 
benefit-finding is construed relative to the valuation or “worth” of the event for one’s life—
which has also been identified as “positive reappraisal” (Folkman, 2001; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). 
Davis et al. (1998) note that the derivation of perceived benefits or “silver linings” from loss can 
be pivotal in assigning positive value in terms of the life of the survivor (i.e., finding something 
positive through the experience), even though this value originally stems from a negative life 
event (the death of a loved one). Benefit-finding has alternately been termed “meaning-as-
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significance” and making sense of the loss “meaning-as-comprehensibility” (Janoff-Bulman & 
McPherson-Frantz, 1997; see also Davis et al., 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2002).  
Some empirical evidence suggests improvements in grief’s duration (shorter) and acuity 
(less severe) where benefit-finding was perceived (e.g., Davis et al., 1998; Michael & Snyder, 
2005; Neimeyer et al., 2006). Davis (2001) asserted that perceived benefits following loss 
normally fit into three categories: “that the event led to (1) a growth in character, (2) a gain in 
perspective, and (3) a strengthening of relationships” (p. 145); relatedly, Tedeschi and Calhoun 
(1996) posit three broad benefit categorizations: “…changes in self-perception, changes in 
interpersonal relationships, and a changed philosophy of life” (p. 456). 
Identity Change 
Gillies and Neimeyer (2006) articulate a third pathway toward meaning reconstruction 
through grief. When grieving individuals reconstruct meaning in their lives following loss, they 
are reconstructing themselves—their self-identities (see also Neimeyer & Anderson, 2002; 
Stroebe & Schut, 2001; Thompson & Janigian, 1988; Zittoun et al., 2008); this reconstructive 
process has been termed identity change. Albeit typically a painful experience, positive changes 
in identity following loss (or other stressful events) have also been referred to as “posttraumatic 
growth” (Tedeschi, 1995; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996; Tedeschi, Cann, et al., 2017; Tedeschi, 
Park, et al., 1998), which is “prevalent in those who respond to loss in adaptive ways” (Gillies & 
Neimeyer, 2006, p. 37) but is not “…the polar opposite of grief distress” (p. 49). The anguish 
associated with difficult losses may eventually lead to a new view of self as ‘‘sadder 
but…wiser,’’ (Janoff-Bulman, 1992, p. 175), or as being somehow gentler (i.e., more empathetic 
and emotionally connected) but also simultaneously made stronger (sometimes via religious, 
spiritual, and/or existential growth) through grief (Gillies & Neimeyer, 2006; Hibberd, 2013; 
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Tedeschi, 1995; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996; Tedeschi, Cann, et al., 2017; Tedeschi, Park, et al., 
1998)—what Simon (2021) describes as “…the way personal loss can [both] stretch and 
strengthen the human heart” (p. 1). 
This is illustrated in the words of Greg Gibson, speaking for the first time directly to 
Wayne Lo, who murdered Gibson’s son, Galen, 25 years earlier: "We've all suffered, we've all 
grown wise from our suffering, and some people do it one way, some people do it another way, I 
understand that" (Inskeep, 2017). Later, Mr. Gibson added: “Almost since the moment Galen 
was killed it's been my constant meditation and focus to take this terrible thing and find some 
good in it, because if we can't and it drags us down, [then] it wins. And that's not—you know—
that's [just] not supportable…” (Brooks, 2017). 
 The above illustration underscores the challenge of etiological discernment with respect 
to meaning-making—also alternately termed “meaning(s) made” (Gillies et al., 2014, 2015; 
Lancaster & Carlson, 2015; Park, 2010, 2013)—since the meaning reconstruction mechanism 
underlying Greg Gibson’s words (here intended as an example of identity change) can plausibly 
be traced back to the other two aforementioned perspective-seeking pathways (making sense of 
the loss and benefit-finding), particularly the latter. Given their potential fungibility, adding more 
pathways should serve a useful purpose—but this must be balanced by parsimony. As such, two 
more are included in this discussion: purpose in life and life significance (see, e.g., Hibberd, 
2013). 
Purpose in Life 
Purpose in life links the import of an ability to articulate reasons to live with positive 
psychological outcomes following on stressful experiences (see, e.g., Frankl, 1946/1984). For 
example, bereaved parents who lose only one of their children have reported higher purpose in 
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life than those losing either an only child or all of their children (Wheeler, 1994), with the clear 
implication being that these parents’ reason to live may relate to their surviving child(ren). 
Life Significance  
Life significance refers to an “…assignment of value to a goal, relationship, or aspect of 
life experience that exists or is pursued in the present and future…. [and that] implies a 
transcendent or ontological importance…” (Hibberd, 2013, p. 679). In this sense, life 
significance can neither be assigned nor rationally defended and “does not depend entirely on 
coherent belief systems—it must be ‘felt’” (p. 680). This would appear to bring one to the limit 
of parsimonious utility with respect to possible perspective-seeking pathways, or does it? 
First, it bears repeating that additional perspective-seeking pathways have been posited, 
including several similar to those outlined in this paper—with some using alternate terminology 
(for summary see, e.g., Park, 2010, 2013; Stroebe & Schut, 2001). As Hibberd (2013) notes: 
“This explosion of constructs has…increased clarity as researchers develop a common language 
to describe different aspects of meaning reconstruction, but also increased confusion as to the 
conceptual relationships among these constructs and the conceptual boundaries of ‘meaning’ 
itself” (p. 671; see also Thompson & Janigian, 1988). For example, it is important to remember 
that for some bereaved individuals, meaning “is” (and may remain) a matter of grieving. 
Second, although perspective-seeking, or the ongoing search for something positive and 
purposeful through the experience of loss, is considered beneficial—and has been empirically 
supported as such (e.g., with respect to meaning-making, see Davis, 2001; Davis et al., 1998; 
Gillies & Neimeyer, 2006; Hibberd, 2013; Neimeyer, 2001a, 2016)—more research is needed 
regarding its possible structural antecedents and/or correlates (for summary see also Park, 2010, 
2013). Whereas prior bereavement research has examined possible relationships between/among 
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religiousness, spirituality, meaning-making, and loss (e.g., Braun & Berg, 1994; Davis et al., 
1998; Lichtenthal et al., 2011; McIntosh et al., 1993; Murphy et al., 2003; Pargament & Park, 
1997; Park, 2005, 2010, 2013; Uren & Wastell, 2002; for summary see also Wortmann & Park, 
2008), as well as considered meaning-making’s mediation of dispositional (optimism-pessimism) 
and situational (age of decedent at death) antecedent factors on adjustment following loss (Davis 
et al., 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2002); excavating other mechanisms that may align with 
or predict perspective-seeking (e.g., resilience, sense of coherence, forgiveness, self-compassion, 
as well as other meaning-generating well-being-related mechanisms that are typically studied 
outside the context of loss) merits additional exploration (see also Huta, 2009; for research 
regarding a resilient grief trajectory, see Bonanno, 2004; Bonanno, Papa, & O’Neill, 2002; 
Bonanno et al., 2002; Bonanno, Wortman, & Neese, 2004; for research on grief acuity as a 
function of attachment security [as operationalized by sense of coherence] and meaning, see 
Uren & Wastell, 2002; for research on grief, forgiveness, and posttraumatic growth, see, e.g., 
Martinčeková & Klatt, 2017). 
Thus, as previously noted, meaning-making constructs are numerous, complex, and 
challenging to comprehensively identify and concisely define. Considering them too broadly 
risks empirical imprecision, but construing them otherwise may risk omitting perspective-
seeking pathways of potential import for some grievers. Furthermore, the scope of this challenge 
is not limited to loss-related meaning-making mechanisms; it can also extend to positive 
psychology constructs (often researched primarily outside the context of loss response) that may 
be important to (re)consider in relationship to grief, meaning, and well-being. These include not 
only resilience, religiousness, spirituality, sense of coherence, forgiveness, and self-compassion 
(as noted above), but could also include awe, communion, Eudaimonia (knowing yourself and 
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becoming who you are; see, e.g., Ryff, 2014), flourishing, gratitude, (progressive) hope, personal 
sense of uniqueness, poignancy, surrender, and other possibly-related well-being constructs. 
 Perhaps it is therefore preferable to consider the complexity in this area of meaning-
making research as one of both challenge and opportunity: opportune in the array of possibly-
relevant mechanisms available to aid in meaning reconstruction in the context of loss, but 
challenging to discretely define them. An improved understanding of these types of meaning-
enhancing concepts (starting with the five considered here) could serve to better help the 
bereaved—both in buffering against grief’s potential complications and in bolstering its 
generative possibilities.  
Chapter 4 Summary 
 Having discussed loss’s potential impact(s) on one’s sense of “what-ness,” “where-ness,” 
and “when-ness” in the previous two chapters, this chapter has delved more into the “why-ness” 
and “how-ness” of responding to significant loss. More generally: why do seemingly 
meaningless things—such as death—happen, and, more specifically, how can meaningfulness 
again be sought and discovered once they have? 
Returning to the doorway analogy—with the door representing the transition between life 
before and after the death of a loved one, and grief as its threshold—direction relates to finding 
purposefulness beyond the threshold, in the post-loss world. Herein termed direction with 
perspective-seeking, this meaning (re)constructing processing is pivotal to reconciling, or the 
ongoing engagement with the reality of the loss. Reconciling is important because it represents 
more of a removal of the door than a closing of it. Perspective-seeking, then, refers to an outlook 
with meaning-generating potential, one that is progressively less dominated by the pre-loss side 
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of the door (or what might have been) and more focused on what is possible, positive, and 
purposeful—even absent (and possibly even because of) what might have been. 
 This sounds better/easier than it often is, however. Perhaps a more apt term than “better” 
would be “less worse” regarding reconciling with perspective-seeking, especially initially. 
Through perception and orientation processing, a sense of direction may (slowly) be 
(re)developed. Meaning can again seem plausible, whereas previously such a “mending” was 
viewed as impossible—or seemed unrealistic and ridiculous to even consider. In this way the 
loss-processing framework represents potentially transforming and generative processes: from 
“nowhere” (necessitating a focus on perception/sense-making) to “now here” (orientation/way-
finding) and then, as outlined in the current chapter, to “know where” (focusing on 
direction/perspective-seeking). 
 That being said, there are no guaranteed, fail-safe short-cuts to these processes. 
Perceiving again, learning how to (better) interpret and trust those perceptions, (re)orienting 
oneself within and beginning to navigate one’s post-loss world, and finding and developing a 
(re)new(ed) sense of purposeful direction are not check-boxes to be ticked off in a step-wise 
progression, but how grief is understood may be important to how it is experienced (see, e.g., 
Granek, 2015), and “…who we are shapes how we grieve” (Neimeyer & Harris, 2011, p. 297). 
As such, the loss-processing framework is perhaps an accessible, interpretive, translational way 
to understand grief that can help to avoid grief’s possible complications while simultaneously 
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Chapter 5. Methods 
 
Current Study 
This research examines bereaved adults’ retrospective self-reports of their grief 
experiences in relationship to the loss-processing framework. The present study focuses on 
descriptive evidence relating to the first of the framework’s three dimensions, perception/sense-
making, and its subcomponents: shock-like symptomatology, intrasensory processing, 
intersensory processing (a.k.a., multimodal integration or intersensory coordination), 
extrasensory processing (hallucinations, illusions, and other post-death experiences of the 
decedent; dreams; threshold consciousness; and transliminality), and time for the purpose of 
initial validation of the construct. 
Participants 
Following receipt of Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval at East Tennessee State 
University (ETSU), all data were collected via online survey. Data collection was managed using 
Research Electronic Data Capture (REDCap) technology. REDCap is a secure, web-based 
software platform designed to support data capture for research studies, providing: 1) an intuitive 
interface for validated data capture; 2) audit trails for tracking data manipulation and export 
procedures; 3) automated export procedures for seamless data downloads to common statistical 
packages; and 4) procedures for data integration and interoperability with external sources 
(Harris et al., 2009, 2019).  
Convenience sample recruitment for survey participants was conducted through:            
1) purposive sampling outreach using social media and social news aggregation/discussion 
websites (e.g., Facebook and Reddit), 2) snowball sampling methods via e-mail, and 3) ETSU’s 
Department of Psychology online participant pool (hosted by Sona Systems; SONA). 
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Advertising for the study targeted bereaved adults (see Appendix B). Ads for participation in the 
study directly linked individuals to the survey in REDCap via the following URL link (see also 
Appendix C): https://etsuredcap.etsu.edu/surveys/?s=RLAYYRD3MA. 
Participation in the study was not incentivized except for students recruited through 
ETSU’s Department of Psychology online participant pool (SONA) who were enrolled in 
selected psychology courses. These students were eligible to receive ½ research participation 
credit for taking part in the survey. For students enrolled in Introduction to Psychology, this ½ 
credit could be applied toward meeting the research requirement for the course; those students 
not reaching a pre-specified threshold for study participation credits for the semester were 
subject to point deductions from their final grade. It should be noted that students could 
participate in other studies in order to reach the specified threshold, and that there was another 
way to complete these credits without participating in any research studies. In most—if not all—
cases, students exceeding the participation credit threshold were eligible for extra credit in 
Introduction to Psychology. Participation was also incentivized via extra credit for certain other 
psychology courses at ETSU; the manner in which this was administered was determined at the 
discretion of each instructor on a course by course basis (with some not offering extra credit).   
Procedures 
Eligible bereaved participants—aged 18+, currently physically present in the United 
States, and who provided informed consent for the study—were given access to a secure, on-line 
survey in REDCap (the Grief Experiences Survey; Appendix C) that included items assessing 
socio-demographical; mental and physical health and well-being; as well as bereavement-, 
mourning-, and grief-related information. Survey participation was anonymous and did not 
require the completion of any/all items; participants were free to exit the survey at any time, or to 
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return to it later via the provision of an anonymous link if they so desired. Links to grief resource 
websites and information regarding how to reach study and/or ETSU IRB staff were provided. 
Although the survey included extensive instrumentation measuring the grief experiences of 
participants relating to all three dimensions of the loss-processing framework (perception/sense-
making, orientation/way-finding, and direction/perspective-seeking), only items addressing 
perception/sense-making are examined in this paper. 
Measures 
               A 143-item battery of self-report survey items (Appendix C) was developed and 
administered in order to gather additional provisional information with respect to the loss-
processing framework. Since the framework is in an early stage of development, this preliminary 
collection of data primarily sought to explore descriptive evidence relating to the framework’s 
first dimension (perception/sense-making); as such, no a priori hypotheses were formally stated 
before data collection was begun. In addition to perception/sense-making, socio-demographic, 
self-reported overall mental and physical health and well-being, and information about 
bereavement, grief, and mourning—as related to a specific death—were collected and are 
described below. 
All survey items were drawn from a combination of existing, psychometrically sound 
instruments (some in part, others in their entirety); select, adapted individual items taken from 
these types of instruments; and author-written questions. The rich descriptions of bereaved 
individuals’ grieving experiences as well as qualitative loss response research were also utilized 
in developing the final battery of measures. A full description of items/instruments—as well as a 




Participant socio-demographical information was collected. This included: age, location 
of residence (by zip code), population density of area of residence (urban, suburban, or rural), 
gender identity, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, living situation, employment information, 
socioeconomic status (SES), relationship status, education, student status, whether or not the 
participant is a parent, religious or non-religious affiliation, and religious service attendance. 
Overall Mental and Physical Health and Well-Being 
Items indicating the overall mental and physical health and well-being of participants—
which, as previously noted, has been shown to be associated with bereavement responses (see, 
e.g., Stroebe et al., 2007)—were included in the survey. Overall well-being was assessed using 
the 5-item World Health Organization Well-being Index (WHO-5; Staehr Johansen, 1998; 
Appendix D), a short questionnaire consisting of simple, non-invasive questions regarding how 
the participant has felt during the last two weeks. 
The WHO-5 Well-Being Index is a brief, generic, global rating scale measuring 
subjective well-being. It is based upon the WHO-10, which was derived from a 28-item rating 
scale originally utilized in WHO research across eight European countries. The WHO-10 was 
developed by choosing the 10 most valid items from the 28-item rating scale, which was initially 
created using Zung scales (for depression, distress, and anxiety) as well as the General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ) and the Psychological General Well-Being Scale (PGWB). Whereas the 
28-item scale and the WHO-10 both include negatively-phrased items to reflect symptoms of 
distress (e.g., Feeling downhearted and blue), the WHO-5 contains only positively worded 
statements (see Appendix D). In the past, the WHO has considered the terms positive well-being 
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and mental health synonymously (Topp et al., 2015); it should also be noted that the WHO-5 
“reflects aspects other than just the absence of depressive symptoms” (Bech et al., 2003, p. 85). 
 As used in the current study, there was a slight change in verb tense (from present perfect 
to present tense). This adjustment was made because most of the non-WHO-5 questions on the 
Grief Experiences Survey ask questions about the more distant past, whereas the WHO-5 
questions (as originally worded) are only asking specifically about the past two weeks (up to the 
present). Example wording as used herein: “I feel calm and relaxed” rather than the WHO-5’s 
original wording: “I have felt calm and relaxed.”  Even in the (rare) instance where a participant 
had experienced the death of a loved one very recently (e.g., in the past month), re-wording these 
items from present perfect to present tense still seemed to make sense (see Appendix D).  
Topp et al. (2015) conducted a systematic review of the WHO-5 literature, concluding 
that it “…is a highly useful tool that can be applied in both clinical practice (for instance to 
screen for depression) as well as in research studies in order to assess well-being over time or to 
compare well-being between groups,” and noting that the WHO-5 “…has been applied 
successfully as a generic scale for well-being across a wide range of study fields” (p. 174). It has 
been translated into more than 30 languages and utilized in a variety of settings worldwide, 
including, for example, with respect to coping strategies (Cole et al., 2013) and in assessing the 
association between psychosocial conditions and well-being (Schütte et al., 2014). Whereas other 
measures, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) Brief Quality of Life Scale 
(WHOQOL-BREF; Bonomi et al., 2000; Skevington et al., 2004) were considered, the WHO-5 
was chosen for its brevity and utility.  
The following two additional items were included to address the perceived overall self-
rated physical and mental health of participants:  
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1. How would you rate your physical health? (poor, fair, good, very good, or excellent) 
2. How would you rate your mental health? (poor, fair, good, very good, or excellent) 
Self-rated health (SRH) is among the most widely used survey measures of subjective 
health. Numerous studies have shown SRH to be consistently and strongly predictive of 
mortality (DeSalvo et al., 2006; Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Mossey & Shapiro, 1982), which is 
considered the most objective measure of individual health (Quesnel-Vallée, 2007). 
SRH has also been shown to be a statistically significant predictor of functional health 
declinations (e.g., Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Idler & Kasl, 1995; Idler, Russell, & Davis, 2000; 
Lee, 2000; Martinez et al., 2010). More recently, Latham and Peek (2013) examined the 
relationship between SRH and incident morbidity, expanding the connection between SRH and 
physical health to include chronic disease—as well as finding evidence suggesting “…that the 
relationship between SRH and physical health outcomes is evident in midlife as well as at older 
ages” (p. 107). 
According to Idler and Benyamini (1997), SRH’s predictive power with respect to health 
declines (particularly mortality) has four possible interpretations: 1) SRH is more inclusive than 
other health-rating measures because it captures preclinical/prodromal symptoms, accounts for 
complex human judgments about the severity of illness, and reflects family history; 2) SRH not 
only accounts for current health status, it also dynamically estimates health trajectory; 3) SRH 
influences behaviors, thus subsequently impacting health status; and 4) SRH reflects the 
availability of personal, economic, and social resources that have been shown to play a role in 
determining health—irrespective of diagnostic specificity or other mechanisms involved (for 
additional information about social conditions and health disparities see, e.g., Link & Phelan, 
1995; Phelan et al., 2010). 
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Bereavement-, Mourning-, and Grief-Related 
Bereavement-related information was also gathered. This included the participant’s 
relationship to the decedent (e.g., familial or other relation), time since death, approximate age of 
the person when they died, cause of death, participant involvement in caring for the decedent 
prior to death’s occurrence (if applicable), and whether or not the death followed palliative/ 
hospice care (i.e., was there foreknowledge of the death prior to its occurrence, and—if so—then 
for approximately how long). Although all of these bereavement-related factors have been shown 
to affect grief outcomes, the latter two (and particularly the last one) are often overlooked (for 
review see Childress, 2016). 
Mourning-related information items included those addressing: 1) whether or not the 
participant viewed the body of their loved one after the death; 2) did a mourning ritual (funeral 
ceremony or memorial service) take place following the death, and, if so, then did the participant 
attend, and—if so—then did they find attending the service to be meaningful or not; and 3) was 
their loved one’s body buried, cremated, or donated for scientific/research/medical purposes? 
Here the paucity of research regarding the relationship between collective mourning rituals and 
grief must be noted (for summary see Childress, 2015; Hoy, 2013; see also Hayslip et al., 2007); 
not only are studies specifically addressing funerals sparse (Hoy, 2013), questions relating to 
funerals are rarely included in grief-related research. 
Grief-related information was assessed using a single item: “Did you seek professional 
help for grief-related issues at any point following the death?” (yes, no, or do not recall; if 
responding yes then from whom [e.g., a therapist, physician, counselor, pastor or spiritual 
advisor, social worker, grief support group, etc.] and “In general did you find this help-seeking to 
be beneficial” [yes, no, or do not recall]). This question emerged during discussions relating to 
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the author’s preliminary project, a literature review investigating possible impacts of 
foreknowledge of death on grief outcomes for survivors (Childress, 2016). The item was initially 
suggested by preliminary project committee-member Dr. Peggy Cantrell as a concise way to 
address possible grief-related complications. 
Bereavement-, mourning-, and grief-related items were included to be used individually 
and descriptively. As such, no scores related to these items have been calculated in this initial 
analysis. 
Perception/Sense-Making  
Items assessing mechanisms relating to the perception/sense-making dimension of the 
loss-processing framework included: 1) shock-like symptomatology; 2) intrasensory processing; 
3) intersensory processing (a.k.a., multi-sensory or multimodal integration); 4) extrasensory 
processing (including hallucinations, dreams, threshold consciousness, and transliminality); and 
5) the subjective experience of time. Discretely addressing each of these five assessment areas 
(and the sub-categorization within some of them) proved to be organizationally unwieldy. There 
is significant overlap among several of these constructs (e.g., hallucinations, dreams, threshold 
consciousness, and transliminality); however, all items included in the survey reflected at least 
one aspect of the perception/sense-making dimension and were identified relative to the 
construct to which they seemed most closely associated. 
Given the retrospective nature of the questions, for most items respondents were asked to 
address both the frequency of occurrence (never, rarely, occasionally, a moderate amount, a 
great deal, or do not recall) as well as the possible change in the prevalence of each phenomenon 
present over time (occurring less often, unchanged, occurring more often, no longer occurring, 
or unsure) since the death. For an example item, in this case evaluating shock-like 
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symptomatology, see Table 1. Note that the last two columns are annotations and do not appear 
in the survey itself; for identification of the acronyms of sources in the final column, see 
Appendix E. 
Table 1 
Sample Item Assessing Perception/Sense-Making 
 
Think about the time 
following the death of 
your loved one. 






or “A great deal,” 









I felt distant from my 
own emotions 
 Never  
 Rarely 
 Occasionally 
 A moderate 
amount 
 A great deal 
 Do not recall 
 


















Many of the items in this section are author-written. Others, as mentioned previously, are 
based on direct quotations of grieving individuals. Some were drawn verbatim or adapted from 
previously published instruments. Although source instruments were subject to prior 
psychometric evaluation, their reliability and validity have not been confirmed for the purposes 
of this study. 
The item development process was iterative. It began with material articulating aspects of 
the loss-processing framework’s first dimension (Chapter 2). Possible items (e.g., those from 
existing instruments measuring aspects of perception/sense-making and from the narrative self-
reports of grieving individuals) were evaluated based on their alignment with each of the 
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framework’s facets. In instances where these item sources were deemed insufficient, the material 
was either adapted or author-written items were subsequently generated. 
Examples of the information and instrumentation utilized in developing survey items 
assessing the shock-like symptoms of the perception/sense-making dimension of the framework 
included: 1) the Specific Symptoms of Acute Stress Disorder (ASD; APA, 2013; Appendix A); 
2) the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS; Bryant et al., 2011; Bryant & Harvey, 2000; Bryant 
et al., 2000; Appendix F); 3) the Stanford Acute Stress Reaction Questionnaire (SASRQ, 
Cardeña et al., 2000; Appendix G); 4) the Depersonalization-Derealization Inventory (DDI; Cox 
& Swinson, 2002; Appendix H); 5) the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES-II; Bernstein & 
Putnam, 1986; Carlson & Putnam, 1993; Frischholz et al., 1990; Appendix I); and 6) the 
Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS; Sierra & Berrios, 1996, 2000; Sierra et al., 2005; 
Appendix J). It should be noted that there were instances of significant overlap in these item-
inclusion source materials (i.e., items across measures were worded quite similarly—if not 
virtually identically). 
Some of the intra-, inter-, and extrasensory items were also developed using the above-
listed resources; others were taken directly from the personal accounts of grievers, and some 
were author-written. Troyer’s (2005, 2014) qualitative research was used in the development of 
extrasensory items, particularly with respect to grief hallucinations—alternately termed post 
death encounters or events (PDE’s; Nowatzki & Grant Kalischuk, 2009). The Revised 
Transliminality Scale (RTS; Houran et al., 2003; Lange et al., 2000; Appendix K) was also 
considered when developing extrasensory perception items, such as those relating to threshold 
consciousness and transliminality. With some exceptions, time-perception-related items were 
mostly author-written. As noted previously, significant overlap was found in the resources used 
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to develop all items assessing perception/sense-making; for a complete listing of these items, 
including source cross-referencing information, see Appendix E. 
Data Cleaning 
Prior to running analyses, data were cleaned to resolve potential problems related to 
unacceptability, incompleteness, or inaccuracy. For example, 18 surveys were entirely blank and 
unconsented, and some of the surveys were completed for the death of a pet, which was not the 
focus of this study; as such, these were deleted.  Participants who answered very few or no items, 
or those who stopped responding to items before beginning the perception/sense-making portion 
of the survey, were not included. Respondents who answered do not recall or never to all or to 
the vast majority of items assessing perception/sense-making were retained—even though those 
were the only response choices that did not prompt a follow-up item about change over time. 
Before data cleaning, the study had an initial sample size of 550 potential survey 
respondents. There were 103 participants whose data were removed because they did not respond 
to any of the items or for one of the other reasons outlined above. This left 447 participants who 
responded to items up to and inclusive of those relating to the primary focus of this study (items 
assessing socio-demographics; overall mental and physical health and well-being; bereavement, 
grief, and mourning; and perception/sense-making). Given the descriptive nature of the current 
research, and considering that participants could skip any items that they did not want to answer, 
results are reported based upon the number of participants that responded to each individual 
item; the number or participants not answering an item are reported as “missing”. 
Planned Data Analyses 
All descriptive statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS (version 27.0) and 
Microsoft Excel (2019) and are reported for: socio-demographical; mental and physical health 
 76 
and well-being-related; and bereavement-, grief-, and mourning-related data. REDCap’s internal 
reports and stats software was used to confirm all analyses performed in SPSS and Excel. For 
socio-demographical and bereavement-, grief-, and mourning-related data, frequencies and 
percentages are reported for nominal variables and means and standard deviations are reported 
for continuous variables. Scores are reported for the WHO-5 Well-Being Index; percentages and 
frequencies are provided for self-rated physical and mental health (SRH). 
Also reported are descriptive statistical analyses of data collected that relate to the loss-
processing framework’s perception/sense-making dimension and its subcomponents (shock-like 
symptoms, intrasensory processing, intersensory processing, extrasensory processing, and time). 
For this preliminary assessment, perception/sense-making items are reported by frequency and 
endorsement percentage on an item by item basis. Endorsement was defined as any response 
choice of: rarely, occasionally, a moderate amount, or a great deal. Responses of never or do 
not recall were considered not endorsing of the item.  
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Chapter 6. Results 
Sample Characteristics  
It must be noted from the onset that these data were collected from August through 
December of 2020. COVID-19 is therefore a characteristic of this sample.   
Also, as previously noted, only one group of participants was recruited with the provision 
of any sort of incentivization—those students recruited to access the REDCap-managed survey 
via SONA (ETSU’s Department of Psychology online participant pool). Thus, results are 
reported for three groups: non-SONA, SONA, and those two groups combined.  
Socio-Demographics 
Diversity characteristics of the study sample and its two subgroups are reported in Table 
2. These include: age, population density of area of residence, gender identity, sexual orientation, 
race/ethnicity, living situation, employment information, socioeconomic status, relationship 
status, education, student status, parental status, religious or non-religious affiliation, and 
religious service attendance. Location of residence (by zip code) was collected but is not 
reported; this item had the lowest response rate of all items included in the study, with 98 
responses missing (21.9%, N = 447). 
 The combined sample (N = 447) was predominantly female (74.1%, n = 329), 
heterosexual (83.3%, n = 370), white (89%, n = 395), Christian (70.7%, n = 316), and ranged in 
age from 18 to 87 years (M = 38.27, SD = 21.56). The Christian affiliation datapoint for this 
sample aligns with a Pew Research Center (2014) survey estimating that 70.6% of U.S. adults 
report a Christian religious affiliation. Here it should also be noted that religious service 
attendance survey responses were probably impacted by COVID-19—although respondents may 
have reported based upon their pre-COVID-19 church attendance patterns (see Table 2).  
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Table 2    










 Age    
 Mean 56.42 20.11 38.27 
 Median 59 19 26 
 SD 16.093 3.198 21.56 
 Min 23 18 18 
 Max 87 45 87 
 Missing 13 (5.8%) 12 (5.4%) 25 (5.6%) 
 Country of Residence    
 US 198 (88.4%) 210 (94.2%) 408 (91.2%) 
 Non-US 3 (1.3%) 1 (0.4%) 4 (1%) 
 Missing 23 (10.3%) 12 (5.4%) 35 (7.8%) 
 Population Density of Area of Residence   
 Urban (100,000+ residents) 33 (14.7%) 29 (13%) 62 (13.9%) 
 Suburban (10,000-100,000 residents) 113 (50.4%) 125 (56.1%) 238 (53.5%) 
 Rural (less than 10,000 residents) 70 (31.3%) 45 (20.2%) 115 (25.8%) 
 Unsure 6 (2.7%) 24 (10.8%) 30 (6.7%) 
 Missing 2 (0.9%) 0 2 (0.4%) 
 Gender Identity    
 Female 188 (83.9%) 141 (63.2%) 329 (74.1%) 
 Male 32 (14.3%) 78 (35%) 110 (24.8%) 
 Other Gender Identity 1 (0.4%) 4 (1.8%) 5 (1.1%) 
 Missing 3 (1.3%) 0 3 (0.7%) 
 Sexual Orientation    
 Asexual 2 (0.9%) 11 (4.9%) 13 (2.9%) 
 Bisexual 9 (4%) 25 (11.2%) 34 (7.7%) 
 Gay 3 (1.3%) 4 (1.8%) 7 (1.6%) 
 Lesbian 2 (0.9%) 4 (1.8%) 6 (1.4%) 
 Pansexual 3 (1.3%) 7 (3.1%) 10 (2.3%) 
 Questioning or unsure 0 3 (1.3%) 3 (0.7%) 
 Straight (heterosexual) 202 (90.2%) 168 (75.3%) 370 (83.3%) 
 Other Sexual Orientation 0 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.2%) 
 Missing 3 (1.3%) 0 3 (0.7%) 
 Race/Ethnicity    
 Alaska Native or Native American Indian 2 (0.9%) 1 (0.4%) 3 (0.7%) 
 Black, Afro-Caribbean, or African American 4 (1.8%) 33 (14.8%) 37 (8.3%) 
 East Asian or Asian American 1 (0.4%) 6 (2.7%) 7 (1.6%) 
 Latino/a or Hispanic American 2 (0.9%) 10 (4.5%) 12 (2.7%) 
 Middle Eastern or Arab American 0 2(0.9%) 2 (0.5%) 
 Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 0 2(0.9%) 2 (0.5%) 
 White or Euro-American (Caucasian) 215 (96%) 180 (80.7%) 395 (89.0%) 
 Multiracial 0 11 (4.9%) 11 (2.5%) 
 Other Race/Ethnicity 0 0 0 
 Missing 2 (0.9%) 0 3 (0.7%) 
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 Living Situation    
 Live alone 56 (25%) 21 (9.4%) 77 (17.2%) 
 Live with parents/guardian 5 (2.2%) 109 (48.9%) 114 (25.5%) 
 Live with roommate(s) 6 (2.7%) 59 (26.5%) 65 (14.5%) 
 Live with spouse/romantic partner 146 (65.2%) 26 (11.7%) 172 (38.5%) 
 No permanent residence 0 4 (1.8%) 4 (0.9%) 
 Other  10 (4.5%) 3 (1.3%) 13 (2.9%) 
 Missing 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.4%) 2 (0.4%) 
 Employment Status    
 Not currently working for pay 17 (7.6%) 72 (32.3%) 89 (19.9%) 
 Working part-time for pay 28 (12.5%) 110 (49.3%) 138 (30.9%) 
 Working full-time for pay  84 (37.5%) 34 (15.2%) 118 (26.4%) 
 Retired 87 (38.8%) 0 87 (19.5%) 
 Other 6 (2.7%) 6 (2.7%) 12 (2.7%) 
 Missing 2 (0.9%) 1 (0.4%) 3 (0.7%) 
 Personal Financial Situation    
 Low-income 6 (2.7%) 86 (38.6%) 92 (20.6%) 
 Lower-middle income 40 (17.9%) 55 (24.7%) 95 (21.3%) 
 Middle-income 103 (46%) 55 (24.7%) 158 (35.3%) 
 Upper-middle income 63 (28.1%) 25 (11.2%) 88 (19.7%) 
 Upper income 10 (4.5%) 1 (0.4%) 11 (2.5%) 
 Missing 2 (0.9%) 1 (0.4%) 3 (0.7%) 
 Current Relationship Status    
 Single never married 16 (7.1%) 117 (52.5%) 133 (29.8%) 
 In a relationship; living separately 2 (0.9%) 70 (31.4%) 72 (16.1%) 
 Cohabitating with a romantic partner 13 (5.8%) 24 (10.8%) 37 (8.3%) 
 Married 132 (58.9%) 8 (3.6%) 140 (31.3%) 
 Separated 2 (0.9%) 2(0.9%) 4 (0.9%) 
 Divorced 22 (9.8%) 0 22 (4.9%) 
 Domestic Partnership 2 (0.9%) 1 (0.4%) 3 (0.7%) 
 Widowed 32 (14.3%) 0 32 (7.2%) 
 Other 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.4%) 2 (0.4%) 
 Missing 2 (0.9%) 0 2 (0.4%) 
 Education    
 Some high school 0 5 (2.2%) 5 (1.1%) 
 Technical training  1 (0.4%) 2(0.9%) 3 (0.7%) 
 High school graduate or equivalent 5 (2.2%) 90 (40.4%) 95 (21.3%) 
 Some college without receiving diploma 24 (10.7%) 90 (40.4%) 114 (25.5%) 
 Associate's degree 14 (6.3%) 16 (7.2%) 30 (6.7%) 
 Bachelor's degree 76 (33.9%) 11 (4.9%) 87 (19.5%) 
 Advanced degree 99 (44.2%) 1 (0.4%) 100 (22.4%) 
 Other 4 (1.8%) 7 (3.1%) 11 (2.5%) 
 Missing      1 (0.4%) 1 (0.4%) 2 (0.4%) 
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 Student Status    
 No 211 (94.2%) 1 (0.4%) 212 (47.4%) 
 Yes, part time 5 (2.2%) 8 (3.6%) 13 (2.9%) 
 Yes, full time 6 (2.7%) 214 (96%) 220 (49.2%) 
 Missing 2 (0.9%) 0 2 (0.4%) 
 Parental Status    
 Yes 160 (72.3%) 13 (5.8%) 175 (39.1%) 
 No 60 (26.8%) 209 (93.7%) 269 (60.2%) 
 Missing 2 (0.9%) 1 (0.4%) 3 (0.7%) 
 Religious Affiliation    
 Buddhist 2 (0.9%) 1 (0.4%) 3 (0.7%) 
 Christian-Catholic 19 (8.5%) 30 (13.5%) 49 (11%) 
 Christian-Protestant 128 (57.1%) 127 (57%) 255 (57%) 
 Episcopalian/Anglican 10 (4.5%) 2(0.9%) 12 (2.7%) 
 Jehovah's Witness 0 2(0.9%) 2 (0.4%) 
 Jewish 1 (0.4%) 0 1 (0.2%) 
 Hindu 0 0 0 
 Mormon/Latter Day Saints 0 0 0 
 Muslim 0 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.2%) 
 Sikh 0 0 0 
 Unitarian Universalist 6 (2.7%) 0 6 (1.3%) 
 Wiccan 1 (0.4%) 2(0.9%) 3 (0.7%) 
 Atheist 13 (5.8%) 10 (4.5%) 23 (5.1%) 
 Agnostic 12 (5.4%) 22 (9.9%) 34 (7.6%) 
 Humanist 6 (2.7%) 0 6 (1.3%) 
 Religious affiliation not specified 13 (5.8%) 16 (7.2%) 29 (6.5%) 
 Other 10 (4.5%) 9 (4%) 19 (4.3%) 
 Missing 3 (1.3%) 1 (0.4%) 4 (0.9%) 
 Religious Service Attendance    
 Never 51 (22.8%) 71 (31.8%) 122 (27.3%) 
 1-2 times per year 47 (21%) 55 (24.7%) 102 (22.8%) 
 Every month 17 (7.6%) 40 (17.9%) 57 (12.8) 
 Every week 101 (45.1%) 46 (20.6%) 147 (32.9%) 
 More than one time per week 6 (2.7%) 9 (4%) 15 (3.4%) 
 Missing 2 (0.9%) 2(0.9%) 4 (0.9%) 
 
Although virtually identical in size, the non-SONA (n = 224) and SONA (n = 223) 
samples differ in multiple ways. For example, the SONA sample is more than 36 years younger 
(M =20.11, SD = 3.2) on average than the non-SONA sample (M = 56.42, SD = 16.09). As 
expected, the SONA group was predominantly comprised of current full-time students (96%, n = 
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214), and in the non-SONA sample 94.2% of participants were not students (n = 211)—but had 
been previously (with 78.1% of the non-SONA group reporting having received a Bachelor’s or 
Advanced degree in the past, n = 175).  
 Most of the socio-demographic and diversity characteristics appear to follow the pattern 
one would anticipate for an older group of adults (38.8% of whom are retired, n = 87) as 
compared to group of young students (of whom 49.3%, n = 110) are working part-time and 
another 15.2% are working full-time (n = 34). This includes with respect to relationship status 
(with the former more likely to be married and be a parent), financial and living situation (with 
students reporting lower incomes—and almost ½ living with a parent or guardian), and the 
younger group reporting somewhat greater racial/ethnic and sexual orientation diversity. Where 
the difference between the two groups is strong, it is striking to see their contrast collapse in the 
descriptive statistics for the total sample combining the two—albeit the inevitable statistical 
resolution of their combination (see, e.g., live with spouse/romantic partner, single never 
married, or advanced degree; Table 2).   
Overall Mental and Physical Health and Well-Being 
The average score on the WHO-5 Well-being Index for the non-SONA group was 75.15 
(SD = 15.4, n = 221). This was more than five percentage points higher (indicating more positive 
reported overall well-being) than the average for the SONA sample, which was 69.97 (SD = 
17.41, n = 222). The combined average for both groups was 72.55 (SD = 16.63, N=443). Records 
for participants who did not answer all of the WHO-5 items were removed prior to calculating 
these scores. Please see Appendix D for additional information regarding the scoring of the 
WHO-5 for this survey. Percentages for self-rated physical and mental health (SRH) across 
samples are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 3     










Physical Health    
poor 4 (1.8%) 7 (3.1%) 11 (2.5%) 
fair 25 (11.2%) 47 (21.1%) 72 (16.1%) 
good 112 (50%) 79 (35.4%) 191 (42.7%) 
very good 68 (30.4%) 69 (30.9%) 137(30.6%) 
excellent  13 (5.8%) 21 (9.4%) 34 (7.6%) 
missing 2 (0.9%) 0 2 (.4%) 
    
Mental Health    
poor 2 (0.9%) 29 (13%) 31 (6.9%) 
fair 31 (13.8%) 70 (31.4%) 101 (22.6%) 
good 90 (40.2%) 77 (34.5%) 167 (37.4%) 
very good 73 (32.6%) 26 (11.7%) 99 (22.1%) 
excellent  27 (12.1%) 20 (9%) 47 (10.5%) 
missing 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.4%) 2 (0.4%) 
  
 Although caution must be taken when interpreting these data, differences between the 
two groups are apparent—particularly with respect to self-rated mental health. For example, the 
percentage of self-rated poor or fair mental health for the SONA (student) sample is 44.4% (n = 
99) as compared to 14.7% (n = 33) for the non-SONA sample; also, student percentages trail 
those of the older group in each of the other three more positive categorizations (good, very 
good, and excellent). These data would not appear to be misaligned with the WHO-5 scores 
across samples. 
Bereavement-, Mourning-, and Grief-Related 
Bereavement-related characteristics are reported in Table 4. These data may reflect some 
of the age-difference-based patterning seen in the socio-demographical and diversity 
characteristics. For example, the three largest percentages for categories of relationship to the 
decedent for the non-SONA sample are husband (17.4%, n = 39), father (18.3%, n = 41) and 
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mother (23.2% 52); and for the SONA sample they are grandfather (22.1%, n = 49), 
grandmother (24.8%, n = 55), and friend (16.2%, n = 36). Here it is possible that the friend 
category may have served to lower the average age of the decedent for the student group (M = 
56.67, SD = 27.52), which was almost 7 years younger than the age at death for the non-SONA 
sample (M = 63.54, SD = 22.11). For the non-SONA group, ⅓ of the deaths were 10+ years ago. 
Table 4    










Relationship to decedent    
Husband 39 (17.4%) 0 39 (8.7%) 
Wife 2 (0.9%) 0 2 (0.4%) 
Partner 2 (0.9%) 0 2 (0.4%) 
Grandfather 12 (5.4%) 49 (22.1%) 61 (13.6%) 
Grandmother 10 (4.5%) 55 (24.8%) 65 (14.5%) 
Father 41 (18.3%) 17 (7.7%) 58 (13%) 
Mother 52 (23.2%) 2 (0.9%) 54 (12.1%) 
Father-in-law 1 (0.4%) 0 1 (0.2%) 
Mother-in-law 2 (0.9%) 1 (0.4%) 2 (0.4%) 
Brother 13 (5.8%) 3 (1.4%) 16 (3.6%) 
Sister 9 (4.0%) 4 (1.8%) 13 (2.9%) 
Brother-in-law 0 0 0 
Sister-in-law 0 0 0 
Son 11 (4.9%) 0 11 (2.5%) 
Daughter 4 (1.8%) 1 (0.4%) 5 (1%) 
Son-in-law 0 (0.0%) 0 0 
Daughter-in-law 1 (0.4%) 0 1 (0.2%) 
Uncle 2 (0.9%) 14 (6.1%) 16 (3.6%) 
Aunt 4 (1.8%) 12 (5.4%) 16 (3.6%) 
Nephew 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.4%) 2 (0.4%) 
Niece 2 (0.9%) 2 (0.9%) 4 (0.8%) 
Friend 14 (6.3%) 36 (16.2%) 50 (11.2%) 
Other 2 (0.9%) 26 (11.7%) 28 (6.3%) 
Missing 0 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.2%) 
Approx. age of the person when they died   
Mean 63.54 56.67 60.13 
Median 68.5 65 67 
SD 22.11 27.52 25.15 
Min 0.33 0 0 
Max 98 105 105 
Missing 4 (1.8%) 6 (2.7%) 10 (2.2%) 
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How long ago did your loved one die?    
< one month 8 (3.6%) 8 (3.6%) 16 (3.6%) 
1-3 months 7 (3.1%) 13 (5.8%) 20 (4.5%) 
4-6 months 6 (2.7%) 11 (4.9%) 17 (3.8%) 
7-12 months 12 (5.4%) 17 (7.6%) 29 (6.5%) 
13-18 months 9 (4%) 7 (3.1%) 16 (3.6%) 
19-24 months 6 (2.7%) 11 (4.9%) 17 (3.8%) 
2-3 years 25 (11.2%) 55 (24.7%) 80 (17.9%) 
4-5 years 31 (13.8%) 36 (16.1%) 67 (15%) 
5-10 years 41 (18.3%) 39 (17.5%) 80 (17.9%) 
More than 10 years 79 (35.3%) 23 (10.3%) 102 (22.8%) 
Missing 0 3 (1.3%) 3 (0.7%) 
Cause of death    
Natural causes (anticipated) 117 (52.2%) 97 (43.5%) 214 (47.9%) 
Natural causes (sudden) 47 (21%) 51 (22.9%) 98 (21.9%) 
Overdose 3 (1.3%) 8 (3.6%) 11 (2.5%) 
Accident 20 (8.9%) 23 (10.3%) 43 (9.6%) 
Suicide 13 (5.8%) 12 (5.4%) 25 (5.6%) 
Homicide 6 (2.7%) 6 (2.7%) 12 (2.7%) 
COVID-19 3 (1.3%) 2 (0.9%) 5 (1.1%) 
Not known 2 (0.9%) 11 (4.9%) 13 (2.9%) 
Other 13 (5.8%) 12 (5.4%) 25 (5.6%) 
Missing 0 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.2%) 
Were you (one of) the primary caregivers?   
Yes 93 (41.5%) 17 (7.6%) 110 (24.6%) 
No 129 (57.6%) 199 (89.2%) 328 (73.4%) 
Do not recall 0 6 (2.7%) 6 (1.3%) 
Missing 2 (0.9%) 1 (0.4%) 3 (0.7%) 
Did the death follow palliative/hospice care?   
Yes 84 (37.5%) 57 (25.6%) 141 (31.5%) 
No 138 (61.6%) 131 (58.7%) 269 (60.2%) 
Unsure 1 (0.4%) 34 (15.2%0 35 (7.8%) 
Missing 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.4%) 2 (0.4%) 
If yes, then how long in hospice care?    
n = Yes from previous question n = 84 n = 57 n = 141 
Less than one week 23 (27.4%) 13 (22.8%) 36 (25.5%) 
1-4 weeks 27 (32.1%) 16 (28.1%) 43 (30.5%) 
5-8 weeks 9 (10.7%) 8 (14%) 17 (12.1%) 
3-6 months 11 (13.1%) 10 (17.5%) 21 (14.9%) 
7-12 months 11 (13.1%) 4 (7%) 15 (10.6%) 
13-18 months 0 1 (1.8%) 1 (.1) 
19-24 months 2 (2.4%) 0 2 (1.4%) 
More than 2 years 1(1.2%) 5 (8.8%) 6 (4.2%) 
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The cause of death categories track more similarly between the two groups, with natural 
causes (anticipated or sudden) and accidents being the top three categorizations (accounting for 
more than ¾ of the causes of death across both groups).  The more elderly non-SONA sample 
reported a higher incidence of having experienced the death of a loved one more than 10 years 
ago (35.3% [n = 79] versus 10.3% [n = 23]). Here it should be noted that given the average age 
of the SONA group (M =20.11, SD = 3.2), up to 43.9% (n = 98) of these respondents may have 
been younger than the age of 18 when they experienced the death of the loved one for whom 
they are responding to this survey. The non-SONA sample was much more likely to have been 
(one of) the primary caregivers for their loved one prior to their death—41.5% (n = 93) as 
compared to only 7.6% (n = 17) for the SONA sample. Fifteen percent of SONA respondents (n 
= 34) were unsure if the death of their loved one followed palliative/hospice care. 
Results for mourning-related characteristics are reported in Table 5. Data for these 
characteristics also indicate more similarity between the two groups than for previous measures. 
Table 5    










Did you view the body of your loved one?   
Yes 151 (67.4%) 125 (56.1%) 276 (61.7%) 
No 72 (32.1%) 88 (39.5%) 160 (35.8%) 
Do not recall 1 (0.4%) 10 (4.5%) 11 (2.5%) 
Missing 0 0 0 
Was there a funeral or memorial 
service?    
Yes 211 (94.2%) 207 (92.8%) 418 (93.5%) 
No 12 (5.4%) 11 (4.9%) 23 (5.1%) 
Do not recall 0 5 (2.2%) 5 (1.1%) 
Missing 1 (0.4%) 0 1 (0.2%) 
If so, then did you attend?    
n = Yes from previous question n = 211 n = 207 n = 418 
Yes 198 (93.8%) 173 (83.6%) 371 (88.8%) 
No 9 (4.3%) 34 (16.4%) 43 (10.3%) 
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If so, then did you attend? (cont’d.)    
Do not recall 1 (0.5%) 0 1 (0.2%) 
Missing 3 (1.4%) 0 3 (0.7%) 
If so, then did you find it to be meaningful?   
n = Yes from previous question n = 198 n = 173 n = 371 
Yes 162 (81.8%) 152 (87.9%) 314 (84.6%) 
No 15 (7.6%) 8 (4.6%) 23 (62%) 
Unsure 20 (10%) 11 ( 6.4%) 31 (8.4%) 
Missing 1 (0.6%) 2 (1.1%) 0.8%) 
Was the body of your loved one?    
Buried 91 (40.6%) 156 (70%) 247 (55.3%) 
Cremated 123 (54.9%) 48 (21.5%) 171 (38.3%) 
Donated for scientific/research 6 (2.7%) 3 (1.3%) 9 (2%) 
Other 3 (1.3%) 1 (0.4%) 4 (0.9%) 
Unsure 1 (0.4%) 15 (6.7%) 16 (3.6%) 
  
When there was a funeral or memorial service, for those reporting having attended, 
84.6% (n = 314) responded that it was meaningful to have done so. Also noteworthy among 
these data is the declination in the of viewing the body of the decedent, which was 11.3 
percentage points lower for the younger/student sample even though this group reported a 29.4 
percentage point higher incidence of burial. Earth burial has been associated with “traditional” 
funerals, which historically included a viewing of the body or wake (Childress, 2015)—
particularly within the South Central Appalachian region (for geographical area definition, see 
Appalachian Regional Commission [ARC], 2021). These data may reflect a (continuing) shift 
away from this particular mourning convention (for summary of possible changes in funeral 
customs in northeast Tennessee, see Childress, 2015), and/or may also be indicative of the 
greater geographical diversity of the non-SONA sample (rates of cremation are higher nationally 
than in the region surrounding ETSU [Cremation Association of North America, 2021]—and the 
SONA sample is an ETSU-student-based sample). 
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 Grief-related characteristics are reported in Table 6. The student sample was less likely to 
have sought counsel following the death of their loved one, with 9.9% (n = 22) reporting having 
done so as compared to 31.7% (n = 71) for the non-SONA sample. It is interesting to note that 
although 22 students in the SONA group reported having had some sort of professional grief 
support after the death of their loved one, five could not recall whether they had sought it or 
not—and indicated do not recall rather than no. For the sample combining both groups, 81.7% (n 
= 93) reported that professional grief counseling was helpful to them. 
Table 6    










   
Yes 71 (31.7%) 22 (9.9%) 93 (20.9%) 
No 152 (67/9%) 196 (87.9%) 348 (78%) 
Do not recall 0 5 (2.2%) 5 (1.1%) 
Missing 1 (0.4%) 0 1 (0.2%) 
If so, then did you find it to be helpful?    
n = Yes from previous question n = 71 n = 22 n = 93 
Yes 60 (84.5%) 16 (72.7%) 76 (81.7%) 
No 10 (14.1%) 6 (27.3%) 16 (17.2%) 
Do not recall 0 0 0 
Missing 1 (1.4%) 0 1 (1.1%) 
 
Perception/Sense-making  
Items assessing perception/sense-making are reported as frequencies with percentage 
endorsement across samples (see Table 7). As noted previously, item response choices of rarely, 
occasionally, a moderate amount, or a great deal are considered endorsing of the item. 
Responses of never or do not recall were calculated as not endorsing; here it should be noted that 
not remembering is not necessarily the same as not having occurred.  
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For these self-reports of grief experiences relating to perception/sense-making, the 
average endorsement percentage among participants in the non-SONA sample (n = 224) was 
13.13 points higher (SD = 10.07) than the SONA sample (n = 223). For the non-SONA sample 
the average endorsement percentage was 43.16% (SD = 24.75) and it was 30.03% for the SONA 
sample (SD = 21.47). For these two groups combined, the average was 36.59% (SD = 21.47, N = 
447). 
Table 7    










1 I had difficulty concentrating/focusing attention  215 (96%) 174 (78%) 389 (87%) 
2 I felt restless  186 (83%) 159 (71.3%) 345 (77.2%) 
3 I felt numb 174 (77.7%) 144 (64.6%) 318 (71.1%) 
4 I felt distant from my own emotions  156 (69.6%) 134 (60.1%) 290 (64.9%) 
5 I felt as if I was in a daze 171 (76.3%) 131 (58.7%) 302 (67.6%) 
6 I felt like I was watching things happen...outside myself 139 (62.1%) 89 (39.9%) 228 (51%) 
7 Memories of the death kept entering my mind 208 (92.9%) 145 (65%) 353 (79%) 
8 My surroundings seemed strange or unreal  107 (47.8%) 84 (37.7%) 191 (48.5%) 
9 I felt like I was slow to respond to what was happening… 150 (67%) 91 (40.8%) 241 (53.9%) 
10 I looked in the mirror and felt...I did not recognize myself  64 (28.6%) 45 (20.2%) 109 (24.4%) 
11 I felt as if I might be losing my mind…. 78 (34.8%) 65 (29.1%) 143 (32%) 
12 Smells seemed weaker or less noticeable than usual  21 (9.4%) 36 (16.1%) 57 (12.8%) 
13 Indoor lights seemed so bright...they bothered my eyes  45 (20.1%) 48 (21.5%) 93 (20.8%) 
14 Tastes seemed blander or less noticeable than usual 65 (29%) 34 (15.2%) 99 (22.1%) 
15 I felt as if the volume control...had been turned down 88 (39.3%) 51 (22.9%) 139 (31.1%) 
16 My vision seemed dulled 41 (18.3%) 35 (15.7%) 76 (17%) 
17 Things...looked different...than how...they really look 55 (24.6%) 44 (19.7%) 99 (22.1%) 
18 People and objects seemed more distant and unclear  61 (27.2%) 37 (16.6%) 98 (21.9%) 
19 Smells seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual 32 (14.3%) 19 (8.5%) 51 (11.4%) 
20 People and objects seemed closer and clearer 18 (8%) 18 (8.1%) 36 (8.1%) 
21 Colors seemed to appear dull or muted  37 (16.5%) 35 (15.7%) 72 (16.1%) 
22 Tastes seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual  21 (9.4%) 16 (7.2%) 37 (8.3%) 
23 I felt as if the volume control...had been turned up 53 (23.7%) 28 (12.6%) 81 (18.1%) 
24 Colors seemed to appear more vivid and vibrant 26 (11.6%) 20 (9%) 46 (10.3%) 
25 I felt like I was walking on shifting ground  108 (48.2%) 61 (27.4%) 169 (37.8%) 
26 I felt as if I was in a fog  173 (77.2%) 90 (40.4%) 263 (58.8%) 
27 I had a sinking feeling in the pit of my stomach 184 (82.1%) 142 (63.7%) 326 (72.9%) 
28 I felt like I was descending rapidly in an elevator  40 (17.9%) 39 (17.5%) 79 (17.7%) 
29 I had especially vivid memories of my loved one…. 211 (94.2%) 168 (75.3%) 379 (84.8%) 
30 I sensed or felt the presence of the person who died  161 (71.9%) 93 (41.7%) 254 (56.8%) 
31 I saw, heard, smelled, or felt touched by my...loved one  103 (46%) 51 (22.9%) 154 (34.5%) 
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32 I thought I heard my deceased loved one's voice  85 (37.9%) 47 (21.1%) 132 (29.5%) 
33 I thought I saw my deceased loved one 55 (37.9%) 41 (18.4%) 96 (21.5%) 
34 I thought I felt my deceased love one beside me  81 (36.2%) 41 (18.4%) 122 (27.3%) 
35 I talked to my loved one even though (s)he is not here 171 (76.3%) 84 (37.7%) 255 (57%) 
36 Things around me felt unreal or dreamlike  154 (68.8%) 93 (41.7%) 247 (55.3%) 
37 It could be hard to tell if I was awake or asleep 28 (12.5%) 34 (15.2%) 62 (13.9%) 
38 I had more dreams 110 (49.1%) 68 (30.5%) 178 (39.8%) 
39 My dreams about my loved one were comforting 124 (55.4%) 78 (35%) 202 (45.2%) 
40 My dreams about my loved one were disturbing 69 (30.8%) 34 (15.2%) 103 (23%) 
41 I had fewer dreams  42 (18.8%) 34 (15.2%) 76 (17%) 
42 I had difficulty falling and/or staying asleep 172 (76.8%) 102 (45.7%) 274 (61.3%) 
43 I felt the presence of my loved one….  104 (46.4%) 48 (21.5%) 152 (34%) 
44 Thinking of my loved one made it easier to fall asleep 71 (31.7%) 39 (17.5%) 110 (24.6%) 
45 On waking I didn't remember that my loved one had died 115 (51.3%) 93 (41.7%) 208 (46.5%) 
46 My thoughts could come so fast I can't write them down 63 (28.1%) 42 (18.8%) 105 (23.5%) 
47 Thinking of my loved one made it harder to fall asleep  138 (61.6%) 87 (39%) 225 (50.3%) 
48 I experienced an altered state of consciousness….  51 (22.8%) 35 (15.7%) 86 (19.2%) 
49 I had...a heightened awareness of sights and sounds….  26 (11.6%) 30 (13.5%) 56 (12.5%) 
50 I felt like I had mystical experiences 45 (20.1%) 21 (9.4%) 66 (14.8%) 
51 Time seemed to pass very slowly 123 (54.9% 88 (39.5%) 211 (47.2%) 
52 Events seemed to happen in slow motion 84 (37.5%) 66 (29.6%) 150 (33.6%) 
53 Time seemed to go by quickly 99 (44.2%) 59 (26.5%) 158 (35.3%) 
54 Events seemed to speed up  53 (23.7%) 42 (18.8%) 284 (63.5%) 
55 Time seemed to stand still  75 (33.5%) 71 (31.8%) 146 (32.7%) 
56 I had difficulty keeping track of time 111 (50.2%) 67 (30%) 178 (39.8%) 
57 It was challenging for me to...gauge the passage of time    89 (39.7%) 58 (26%) 147 (32.9%) 
58 I felt that my sense of time didn't work the way it used to 78 (34.8%) 56 (25.1%) 134 (30%) 
  
Note. Missing records < 5 for all items; the average number of missing records was 1.52 (SD = 1.2). Items 
#38 and #41 (I had more/fewer dreams) do not include a follow-up item (How has this changed over 
time?) for those endorsing, as this would not have made sense. All other items do feature this follow-up. 
As it appears in this table, wording of some items has been altered slightly; see Appendix C for exact 
wording. 
 
In Chapter 2, the perception/sense-making dimension of the loss-processing framework 
was described using the following subcomponents: shock-like symptoms, intrasensory 
processing, intersensory processing, extrasensory processing, and time. Extrasensory processing 
was further subdivided into hallucinations, dreams, threshold consciousness, and transliminality. 
Chapter 5 outlined the process used for researching, selecting, and developing items assessing 
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each of these categorizations. Challenges in separating these constructs and appropriately 
assigning items to assess each of them has been noted previously; data summarizing their 
percentage endorsement (by category) across samples is presented in Table 8. 
Table 8     
Perception/Sense-Making Percentage Endorsement by Category Across Samples 









     
Shock-like symptoms (1-11) 66.88% 51.41% 59.14% 
Intrasensory processing (12-24) 19.33% 14.52% 16.93% 
Intersensory processing (25-28) 56.36% 37.22% 46.79% 
Extrasensory processing (29-50) 40.50% 25.68% 33.09% 
 Hallucinations (29-35) 55.29% 33.63% 44.46% 
 Dreams (36-41) 39.21% 25.49% 32.35% 
 Threshold consciousness (42-47) 49.33% 30.72% 40.02% 
 Transliminality (48-50) 18.16% 12.86% 15.51% 
Time (51-58) 39.73% 28.42% 34.08% 
 
Note. See Table 7 for a numbered listing of all Perception/Sense-Making items. 
 
 As summarized for the combined sample of both groups (in the third column above), 
these data indicate lower endorsement for items designated to assess intrasensory processing 
(16.93%) and the transliminality subcategory of extrasensory processing (15.51%). Higher 
endorsement percentages were reported for intersensory processing (46.79%), the hallucinations 
subcomponent of extrasensory processing (44.46%), and shock-like symptoms (59.14%). The 
latter two categories exhibit the greatest differences between the non-SONA and SONA samples, 
with the younger/SONA group’s percentage being 19.14 points lower for intersensory processing 
and 21.66 points lower for hallucinations. Findings offer initial support for the validity of the 
construct of grief-related sensory perceptions (perception/sense-making). Many of the proposed 
perceptions were endorsed, however there was wide variation among them (e.g., the highest 
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Chapter 7. Discussion 
Analysis 
 Results from this preliminary survey of self-report items assessing aspects of the loss-
processing framework’s first dimension (perception/sense-making) indicate provisional support 
across its subcomponents, with participants endorsing some aspects of the dimension more than 
others. The lower endorsement percentage for intrasensory processing assessment items may 
relate to the agnosia-like qualities of this particular component of perception/sense-making. With 
respect to agnosia-like symptoms in bereavement, it is important to recall (as outlined in Chapter 
2) that with agnosia no single sense is actually impaired—only its perception—and there is no 
major memory loss (see, e.g., Joseph, 2018; Puente & Tonkonogy, 2009). This could mean that 
(mild,) grief-related agnosic symptoms are not recalled because they are not remembered by the 
person who had them—not necessarily because they did not occur. This feature of agnosia could 
make recalling them in retrospect difficult. The assessment of agnosia in non-grief contexts can 
also be challenging (see, e.g., Bauer, 2006; Burns, 2004). For example, diagnosing visual 
agnosia may require participants to view a photograph and then to draw or describe it—with 
diagnostic criteria relying on discrepancies between the two. Retrospectively detecting this type 
of intrasensory disruption using Likert-scale items may not be possible. That being said, agnosia-
like symptoms relating to the tracking of time were more endorsed in this survey (34.08%, n = 
152). Thus, including time-related items could benefit the assessment of intrasensory processing 
in relationship to grief.  
Another possible factor in the lower endorsement of intrasensory processing is the 
bidirectionality of several of the items (e.g., see item numbers: 12 & 19, 14 & 22, 15 & 23, 18 & 
20, and 21 & 24; Appendix C). Although perhaps consistent with the oft-reported wave-like 
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patterning of the experience of grief—possibly similar to the oscillation described in Stroebe and 
Schut’s (1999, 2001, 2010) dual process model (DPM) of coping in grief—including items 
asking respondents to consider endorsing (or not) pairs of “opposites” could have been 
problematic. For example, including the two items smells seemed weaker or less noticeable than 
usual and smells seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual may have served to dampen the 
endorsement of both (this could have also impacted other portions of the survey, e.g., with 
respect to dreams). During survey development a disclaimer was considered to address this 
concern. This would have been a brief statement (provided prior to starting the survey) indicating 
that discrepant items could both be endorsed (or not), since grief is often experienced in a wave-
like manner—with certain of its characteristics seeming to ebb and flow over time. In the end 
such a statement was not included due to concerns that it could be too confusing for participants. 
An over-valuing of the meaning assigned to sensory stimuli (included as an agnosia-like 
characteristic in the section on intrasensory processing in Chapter 2) could be an alternative way 
to better assess this duality. For example, these items could be constructed using more nuanced 
language addressing the potential meaningfulness and/or enhancement of sensory-perceptual 
experiences through grief, rather than merely confirming whether or not specific senses seemed 
stronger or weaker (than usual). Such an approach could help with items assessing another of the 
lesser-endorsed constructs included in the current survey, transliminality. It is important to 
remember, however, that lower item endorsement does not preclude an item’s potential utility—
possibly as an indication of grief complications or of a growth/learning opportunity. Exploring 
alexithymia as well as expressive and affective agnosia as potential sources for items relating to 
emotional perception could also be beneficial to intrasensory item development. 
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Thelen and Smith’s (1994) assertion that “…there is little or no learning or development 
that is strictly within modality” (p. 194) also bears mentioning with respect to challenges in 
measuring intrasensory processing. Experiencing the world multimodally may make it harder to 
remember those experiences unimodally. This could be (one of) the reason(s) intersensory 
processing was the second most endorsed component of perception/sense-making (46.79%). 
The percentage endorsement for hallucinations (a subcategory of extrasensory 
processing) was close to that of intersensory processing for the combined sample (44.46%); 
recall that these two categories also feature the greatest disparity in percentages between the two 
groups, with the SONA sample being 21.66 points lower for hallucinations and 19.14 points 
lower for intersensory processing (threshold consciousness was third at 18.61 points lower). The 
language used for the hallucination-related items could perhaps aid in teasing this apart in the 
future. For example, item 30 (I sensed or felt the presence of the person who died) could be used 
with either sensed or felt the presence of (rather than both) along with my loved one instead of of 
the person who died to see if this would be more similarly endorsed by both the SONA and non-
SONA samples. As noted previously, the stigma associated with reporting having had 
hallucinatory experiences may have played a role in endorsement levels for these items. It could 
also be that these are age- or other sample characteristic-related differences that are not 
language-dependent.  
Shock-like symptoms was the most endorsed category for both groups of participants, 
with the combined sample endorsing these 11 items averaging 59.14%. It is possible that this 
was influenced by the fact that these were the first non-socio-demographical items to be 
presented in the survey, and participants were ready to get started (thus perhaps attending to 
these initial items more than to those that followed). Other possibilities include, but are not 
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limited to: 1) shock is typically considered a temporary physiological state and is therefore 
possibly more endorsable than (some of the) other characteristics outlined in the 
perception/sense-making dimension—which could be viewed as potentially more permanent, 
psychological in nature, and therefore also more subject to stigmatization. The word shock was 
not, however, used in any of these items, and several of them related to dissociative symptoms of 
severe (dis)stress (e.g., items 4, 6, 8, and 10). 2) The author’s past experiences as a funeral 
director could have served to somehow aid in the selection of shock-like symptom-related items, 
since most often a funeral director is with families during the period of time immediately after 
the death of their loved one (which is known to feature shock-like symptoms). This may have 
influenced the selection of more authentic or resonant items assessing shock-like symptoms for 
those remembering their grief. These items were also closely aligned with those from existing 
scales with items assessing acute (dis)stress, dissociation, depersonalization, and derealization, 
which were valuable tools in developing assessment items for shock-like symptoms relating to 
grief (see Appendices A and E – J). 3) Participants possibly endorsed these items more often 
because they included more general descriptions (e.g., I had difficulty concentrating/focusing 
attention; I felt restless; I felt numb; I felt as if I was in a daze) that were therefore more 
endorsable. 4) These items resonated more with the grief experiences of participants; thus, they 
were more endorsed by those participating in the survey. Or, 5) A combination of the 
aforementioned factors. 
Implications 
This study articulates a new approach to the understanding of grief, the loss-processing 
framework. While there is existing support for the framework’s three dimensions: 
perception/sense-making, orientation/way-finding, and direction/perspective-seeking (as 
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articulated in Chapters 2-4), extant support is strongest for the framework’s third dimension, 
direction/perspective-seeking (or meaning-making). Thus, this preliminary study examined the 
self-reported retrospective survey responses of bereaved adults containing items selected or 
developed to assess what is perhaps the least-well studied dimension of the framework, 
perception/sense-making—and its subcomponents.  
The current project added descriptive detail regarding how grief is understood in 
relationship to sensory-perceptual processing. Results confirmed some support for selected 
aspects of the perception/sense-making dimension (e.g., shock-like symptoms, intersensory 
processing, and the extrasensory processing subcomponents of hallucinations and threshold 
consciousness) but found less support for items assessing other facets of the dimension (e.g., 
intrasensory processing and the extrasensory processing subcomponent of transliminality). 
 Challenges regarding the assessment of perception/sense-making may relate to how some 
aspects of this dimension of the framework have been categorized. For example, including 
possible agnosia-like impacts on the intrasensory processing of the perception of time and 
emotions during grief may be helpful in future development of assessment items. Also, altering 
items to avoid bidirectionality could aid in better assessing intrasensory processing and dreams 
in perception/sense-making.  
The primary aim of collecting and examining these data was to conduct an initial 
empirical investigation of the first dimension of the loss-processing framework. Doing so 
underscores the import of the item development process. For example, item 28 (I felt like I was 
descending rapidly in an elevator) was extrapolated from the feeling described by Handler 
(1999) when: “…thinking there is one more stair than there is. Your foot falls down, through the 
air, and there is a sickly moment of dark surprise as you try and readjust the way you thought of 
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things” (p. 97). An item relating to this feeling Handler describes might be endorsed differently 
than the elevator item that was included in the current survey (which received the fewest 
endorsements of all items assessing intersensory processing). Similarly, of the eight items 
relating to the perception of time, two (51 and 56) were endorsed more often; thus, only these 
could be used in the future to avoid redundancy. 
An important implication of the current study, then, is that although it indicates some 
preliminary support for the loss-processing framework’s first dimension, much additional work 
is needed. Going forward, some of this work will rely upon continued data collection (which is 
ongoing). A thorough investigation of socio-demographical, bereavement, mourning, grief, and 
health-related data in association with the perception/sense-making dimension’s components is 
warranted. These analyses will be done in tandem with an assessment of survey data collected 
regarding the framework’s other two dimensions, orientation/way-finding and 
direction/perspective-seeking, as well as data regarding the trajectory of each item’s change over 
time. Direction/perspective-seeking includes psychometrically validated instrumentation 
assessing meaning-making, and orientation/way-finding includes items that potentially overlap 
with those assessing perception/sense-making. 
Limitations 
 Data collection during COVID-19 is a potential limitation of this study. Retrospective 
self-reports of the experience of loss response during a time of such exceptional loss(es) was 
possibly problematic. Five participants reported having experienced the loss of a loved one due 
to the pandemic in their survey responses. It was unfortunate to be assessing grief when 
attending collective mourning rituals was, for the most part, not possible. Lockdowns, closures, 
and isolation related to the pandemic may have increased the likelihood of online survey 
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participation, but trust in (and participation on) the social media platforms used to promote the 
survey to potential participants was tenuous during this time of upheaval. The reported mental 
and physical health and well-being of participants was also likely impacted by COVID-19. 
 Some characteristics of the SONA sample are also limiting, including a lack of 
geographic and age diversity (constricting the generalizability of these findings), as well as 
incentivized participation. The SONA studies that were available on-line (and needed in order to 
achieve the required research credits to avoid grade degradation) were few in number; it is 
difficult to imagine—but hard to know—how this would not have resulted in participation 
outside of study guidelines (i.e., students taking the survey who were not bereaved). Opening the 
survey to SONA in the first place was due to another limitation of the study, finding participants. 
In this case SONA enabled outreach to and procurement of as many participants in a few weeks 
as had been previously enlisted in as many months—but their data remains marginally suspect 
due to the incentivization of their participation. 
 There were gender identity, race, sexual orientation, and religious affiliation diversity 
deficiencies for both the SONA and non-SONA samples. The ETSU/SONA sample did exhibit 
more diversity than the non-SONA sample in terms of race/ethnicity and sexual orientation. The 
non-SONA group provided greater geographical and age diversity. 
 Limitations regarding research involving individuals who have experienced loss due to 
the death of a loved one are well documented (see, e.g., Cassileth & Lusk, 1989; Grande & 
Todd, 2000; Hudson et al., 2005; Hudson & Hayman-White, 2006). Doing so by anonymous 
online survey may appear to alleviate some of these concerns, but not altogether. Selecting and 
wording items for inclusion in the survey was particularly difficult; efforts to “do no harm” in the 
process of probing for meaningful information regarding the grief experiences of individuals 
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proved both challenging and limiting. For example, the age of decedent at time of death item did 
not allow for deaths under the age of 1, which resulted in some participants selecting “0” or 
using decimal points in response to this item. And for the final mourning-related characteristic, 
burial and cremation are not mutually exclusive; the former can follow the latter. Also, the 
ordering of items in the survey was limiting—whereas randomizing them would have been 
preferred, to avoid possible order effects, doing so could have made the participants’ experience 
potentially more taxing. Item ordering was therefore not randomized. 
Future Directions 
 Having described the loss-processing framework and subsequently designed and 
implemented a preliminary survey of self-report items assessing aspects of its dimensional 
components (one of the three of which is reported herein), a future research direction will be to 
finalize data collection for this assessment and to further analyze it. This includes data regarding 
the framework’s three dimensions, their possible relationship(s) to one another, and the potential 
associations between/among them and mental and physical health and well-being; specified 
characteristics of bereavement, grief, and mourning; and socio-demographical factors. Follow-up 
items regarding the trajectory of change over time (occurring more often, occurring less often, 
unchanged, or no longer occurring) will be important to consider, as these trajectories may aid in 
possibly predicting other constructs assessed in the survey (e.g., those addressing health and 
well-being, grief, and/or meaning-making). Further refinement of the items/instruments assessing 
the framework will be a natural outgrowth of this line of research and will be requisite to further 
examination of the relationships outlined above. 
The framework may have utility as an applied, interpretive model of grief as well. This 
was the reason for its initial conception, to perhaps serve as a modular tool to help individuals 
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better apprehend their grief in order to grow both through and with it. For example, might it be 
possible to create an environment for survivors where awareness of dimensional aspects of the 
loss-processing framework (perception/sense-making, orientation/way-finding, and 
direction/perspective-seeking) is cultivated for individuals prior to death’s occurrence (in pre-
loss bereavement—during palliative/hospice care for their loved one), so as to better leverage the 
experience of loss (which is inevitable) toward positive personal growth for survivors in its 
wake? Or might a post-loss intervention more fully articulating and encouraging awareness of 
the loss-processing framework’s dimensions suffice? Or would a combination of both of these 
approaches be preferred? And, as noted at the end of Chapter 4, more research is needed 
regarding the possible underlying relationship(s) between and among potential constructs such as 
resilience, religiousness, spirituality, sense of coherence, forgiveness, and self-compassion (as 
well as awe, communion, Eudaimonia, flourishing, gratitude, [progressive] hope, personal sense 
of uniqueness, poignancy, surrender, and other meaning-making-related concepts) and the 
components of the loss-processing framework.  
Conclusion 
The current study articulated a novel approach to framing our understanding of response 
to loss due to human death, the loss-processing framework. Fifty-eight preliminary items 
assessing the framework’s first dimension, perception/sense-making, were developed and 
administered to a group of 447 participants; initial support for the framework was indicated in 
the survey responses from this sample.  
A better understanding of grief through the loss-processing framework may serve to 
identify and possibly alleviate (or even prevent) complications due to bereavement, improve 
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interventions when such complications are indicated, and enhance the adaptive and generative 
potential for personal growth in response to loss. 
Considering the provisional nature of the current study, further inquiry is necessary. First, 
additional work is warranted regarding the framework’s other two dimensions (orientation/way-
finding and direction/perspective-seeking). These data have been—and are continuing to be— 
collected as of the completion of this paper, and their analysis is forthcoming. Future research, 
perhaps also using qualitative and/or mixed methods approaches, may be needed to provide 
additional descriptive detail regarding the range of grief experiences relating to the proposed 
framework. These added empirical techniques could aid in adapting and creating measurement 
instrumentation (possibly using items included herein) to better leverage the loss-processing 
framework as a possibly predictive, interpretive, and functional tool for enhancing grief, mental 
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Appendix A: Specific Symptoms of Acute Stress Disorder (ASD: APA, 2013) 
Acute stress disorder is most often diagnosed when an individual has been exposed to a 
traumatic event in which both of the following were present: 
• The person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with (e.g., can include learning of) 
an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to 
the physical integrity of self or others. 
• Though not required, the person’s response is likely to involve intense fear, helplessness, 
or horror. 
Either during or following the distressing event, the individual has 3 or more of the following 
dissociative symptoms: 
• A subjective sense of numbing, detachment, or absence of emotional responsiveness 
• A reduction in awareness of his or her surroundings (e.g., “being in a daze”) 
• Derealization 
• Depersonalization 
• Dissociative amnesia (i.e., inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma) 
The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in at least one of the following ways: recurrent 
images, thoughts, dreams, illusions, flashback episodes, or a sense of reliving the experience; or 
distress when exposed to reminders of the traumatic event. 
Acute stress disorder is also characterized by significant avoidance of stimuli that arouse 
recollections of the trauma (e.g., avoiding thoughts, feelings, conversations, activities, places, 
people). The person experiencing acute stress disorder also has significant symptoms of anxiety 
or increased arousal (e.g., difficulty sleeping, irritability, poor concentration, hypervigilance, 
exaggerated startle response, motor restlessness). 
For acute stress disorder to be diagnosed, the problems noted above must cause clinically 
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning 
or impairs the individual’s ability to pursue some necessary task, such as obtaining necessary 
assistance or mobilizing personal resources by telling family members about the traumatic 
experience. 
The disturbance in an acute stress disorder must last for a minimum of 3 days and a maximum of 
4 weeks, and must occur within 4 weeks of the traumatic event. Symptoms also cannot be the 
result of substance use or abuse (e.g., alcohol, drugs, medications), caused by or an exacerbation 
of a general or preexisting medical condition, and cannot be better explained by a brief psychotic 
disorder. 
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Appendix B: Advertisements and Other Participant Recruitment Materials 
Snowball e-mail template (and Facebook/Reddit ad): 
As part of my research to better understand the experience of grief, I am collecting data via an 
online survey. 
If you have experienced grief in response to loss due to human death, then I invite you to take 
the survey. 
Please also forward this e-mail invitation to others and share the ad below through your social 
media. 
The link to the survey is here:  Grief Experience Survey 




Larry Childress, M.A. 
Doctoral Student 
Translational Experimental Psychology 






SONA Ad Description 
 
This study seeks to better understand the experience of grief in response to loss due to human 
death. Participants will be asked to complete an online survey regarding their personal experience 
of loss, their overall health/well-being, and meaning in their lives. Although times will vary, it 
should take approximately 30 minutes to complete the survey, which also includes some questions 
collecting demographic information. Participation in this research is completely voluntary and may 
be discontinued at any time; all responses are anonymous. 
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Appendix C: The Grief Experiences Survey 
 Age:        
 Country of residence (US, non-US):      
 What is your zip code?      
 If non-US country, what is your country of residence?  
 Please indicate the type of area you currently live in (urban, suburban, rural):  
 Gender identity (female, male, other):     
 Sexual orientation (asexual, bisexual, gay, lesbian, pansexual, questioning or unsure, straight, other): 
 
Race/Ethnicity (please select all that apply; Alaska native, Black, East Asian, Latino/a or Hispanic, 
     Middle Eastern, Native Hawaiian, White, Multiracial, other):  
 
Which of the following best describes your living situation (live alone, with parents, roommate, 
     spouse/romantic partner, no permanent residence, other)?   
 
Please describe your current employment status (not working, working part-time, working full-time, 
     retired, other):   
 
How would you classify your personal financial situation (low-income, lower-middle income,  
     middle-income, upper-middle income, upper income)?   
 
Please describe your current relationship status (single never married, in a relationship living 
     separately, cohabitating with a romantic partner, married, separated, divorced, domestic 
     partnership, widowed, other):   
 
Education (please select one; some high school, technical training, high school grad or equivalent, 
     some college no diploma, associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, advanced degree, other ):   
 Are you a student (no, yes part time, yes full time)?    
 Are you a parent (yes, no)?    
 
Religious or non-religious affiliation (please select one; Buddhist, Christian-Catholic, Christian- 
     Protestant, Episcopalian/Anglican, Jehovah’s Witness, Jewish, Hindu, Mormon, Muslim, Sikh, 
     Unitarian, Wiccan, Atheist, Agnostic, Humanist, Religious affiliation not specified, other):  
 How often do you go to religious services (never, 1-2 time/year, every month, every week? 
 
I feel calm and relaxed (WHO-5 Q1; at no time, some of the time, less than ½ of the time, more 
     than ½ of the time, all of the time—see Appendix D for additional information re. responses)   
 I feel cheerful and in good spirits (WHO-5 Q2)  
 I feel active and vigorous (WHO-5 Q3)   
 I wake up feeling fresh and rested (WHO-5 Q4)  
 My daily life is filled with things that interest me (WHO-5 Q5) 
 How would you rate your physical health (poor, fair, good, very good, excellent): 
 How would you rate your mental health? (poor, fair, good, very good, excellent): 
 
Please complete the following statement describing your relationship to the person who died: 
     he or she was my (husband, wife, partner, grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, father-in-law 
     mother-in-law, brother, sister, brother-in-law, son, daughter, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, friend,  
     other)? 
 
Approximately how long ago did your loved one die (< 1 month, 1-3 months, 4-6, 7-12, 13-18, 
     19-24 months, 2-3 years, 4-5, 5-10, more than 10 years):  
 Approximate age of the person when they died 
 
Cause of death (natural causes-anticipated; natural causes-sudden, overdose, accident, homicide, 
     COVID-19, Not known, Do not recall):   
 
Were you (one of) the primary caregiver(s) for your loved one prior to their death (yes, no, do not  
     recall)? 
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 Did the death of your loved one follow palliative/hospice care (yes, no, do not recall)?  
 
If yes then approximately how long was your loved one in palliative/hospice care (1-4 weeks,  
     5-8 weeks, 3-6 months, 7-12, 13-18, 19-24, more than 2 years)? 
 Did you view the body of your loved one after the death (yes, no, do not recall)?  
 
Was there any type of funeral ceremony or memorial service for your loved one (yes, no, do not 
     recall)?  
 If so, then did you attend (yes, no, do not recall)?    
 If so, then did you find attending the service to be meaningful (yes, no, do not recall)? 
 
Was the body of your loved one (cremated, buried, donated for scientific/medical/research purposes,  
     other): 
 
Did you seek professional help for grief-related issues at any point following this death (yes, no, 
     do not recall)?  
 
If so, then from whom did you seek help (such as, a therapist, physician, counselor, pastor or spiritual  
     advisor, social worker, grief support group, etc.)? 
 In general, did you find this help-seeking to be beneficial to you (yes, no, do not recall)?  
 
Response options for 1-66: never, rarely, occasionally, a moderate amount, a great deal or do not recall. 
If responding never, rarely, occasionally, a moderate amount, or a great deal, then followed by: 
How has this changed over time?: less often, unchanged, more often, no longer occurring, or unsure.         
NOTE: Items #38 and #41 (I had more/fewer dreams) do not include a follow-up item (How has this changed over 
time?), as this would not have made sense. 
1 I had difficulty concentrating/focusing attention 
2 I felt restless     
3 I felt numb    
4 I felt distant from my own emotions   
5 I felt as if I was in a daze   
6 I felt like I was watching things happen from outside myself 
7 Memories of the death kept entering my mind 
8 My surroundings seemed strange or unreal  
9 I felt like I was slow to respond to what was happening around me 
10 I looked in the mirror and felt as though I did not recognize myself  
11 I felt as if I might be losing my mind, but I was reluctant to share this with others 
12 Smells seemed weaker or less noticeable than usual  
13 Indoor lights seemed so bright that they bothered my eyes  
14 Tastes seemed blander or less noticeable than usual 
15 I felt as if the volume control on my world had been turned down 
16 My vision seemed dulled   
17 Things I saw looked different to me than how I know they really look 
18 People and objects seemed more distant and unclear  
19 Smells seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual 
20 People and objects seemed closer and clearer 
21 Colors seemed to appear dull or muted   
22 Tastes seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual  
23 I felt as if the volume control on my world had been turned up 
24 Colors seemed to appear more vivid and vibrant 
25 I felt like I was walking on shifting ground  
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26 I felt as if I was in a fog   
27 I had a sinking feeling in the pit of my stomach 
28 I felt like I was descending rapidly in an elevator  
29 I had especially vivid memories of my loved one who died 
30 I sensed or felt the presence of the person who died  
31 I saw, heard, smelled, or felt touched by my deceased loved one  
32 I thought I heard my deceased loved one's voice  
33 I thought I saw my deceased loved one  
34 I thought I felt my deceased love one beside me  
35 I talked to my loved one even though (s)he is no longer living 
36 Things around me felt unreal or dreamlike  
37 It could be hard to tell if I was awake or asleep 
38 I had more dreams    
39 My dreams about my loved one were comforting 
40 My dreams about my loved one were disturbing 
41 I had fewer dreams     
42 I had difficulty falling and/or staying asleep 
43 I felt the presence of my loved one, but could not see, hear, touch, or smell anyone there  
44 Thinking of my loved one made it easier to fall asleep 
45 When I first woke up, sometimes initially I didn't remember that my loved one had died 
46 My thoughts could come so quickly that I couldn't seem to write them down fast enough 
47 Thinking of my loved one made it harder to fall asleep  
48 I experienced an altered state of consciousness in which I felt that I became more enlightened  
49 I had such a heightened awareness of sights and sounds that I felt I could not shut them out  
50 I felt like I had mystical experiences  
51 Time seemed to pass very slowly  
52 Events seemed to happen in slow motion 
53 Time seemed to go by quickly   
54 Events seemed to speed up    
55 Time seemed to stand still    
56 I had difficulty keeping track of time  
57 It was challenging for me to accurately gauge the passage of time    
58 I felt that my sense of time didn't work the way it used to 
59 I felt challenged in navigating the world around me 
60 I misplaced things    
61 It seemed to take me longer to accomplish tasks-- to get from A to B-- than usual for me 
62 I felt as if my internal compass stopped working 
63 There have been times when it seemed harder for me to gauge the distance between things 
64 I've felt lost    
65 I had difficulty remembering things   
66 I felt as if I just woke up in an unfamiliar place 
 
 
Response options for 67-76: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or 
strongly disagree. 
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67 Since the death, I don't know where to go next in my life 
68 I don't understand myself anymore since the death 
69 The death has made me feel less purposeful 
70 I have difficulty integrating the death into my understanding about the world  
71 This death is incomprehensible to me  
72 I am perplexed by what happened  
73 I'm more creative    
74 I've grown as a person    
75 I'm better able to adapt to different and changing situations  
76 I'm more able to find meaning in life   
 
Response options for 77-85: Does not describe me at all, Does not quite describe me, Describes me 
fairly well, Describes me well, or Describes me very well  
77 I have learned to cope better with life  
78 I feel as though I am a better person  
79 I have a better outlook on life   
80 I have more compassion for others   
81 I am stronger because of the grief I have experienced  
82 I am a more forgiving person   
83 I am more tolerant of myself   
84 I am having more good days than bad   
85 I care more deeply for others   
 
Response options for 86-91: I did not experience this change as a result of the death, I experienced 
this change to a very small degree as a result of the death, I experienced this change to a small 
degree as a result of the death, I experienced this change to a moderate degree as a result of the 
death, I experienced this change to a great degree as a result of the death, or I experienced this 
change to a very great degree as a result of the death 
86 I have greater clarity about life's meaning 
87 I feel better able to face questions about life and death 
88 I feel more connected with all of existence  
89 I have a greater sense of harmony with the world  
90 I have a better understanding of spiritual matters 
91 I have a stronger religious faith  
 
Response options for 92-93: never true of me, occasionally true of me, fairly often true of me, very  
often true of me, always true of me, or not applicable 
92  




Although I may not see results from my labor, I will continue to implement God's plans  
as long as God directs me to do so. 
94  
How much sense would you say you have made of the loss of your loved one? 
no sense, slight sense, some sense, a moderate amount of sense, or a great deal of sense 
95  
Despite the loss, have you been able to find any benefit from your experience of the loss? 
no benefit, slight benefit, some benefit, moderate amount of benefit, or a great deal of benefit 
96  
Do you feel that you are different--that your sense of identity has changed--as a result of this loss? 
not at all different, slightly different, somewhat different, moderately different, or a great deal different 
97 
  
What has been the direction in this difference in your sense of how your identity has changed? 
for the better, mixed, or for the worse 
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98 How have you searched for meaning in your loved one's death? 
99 How have you searched for meaning in your own life since your loved one's death? 
100 What additional support did you need following the death of your loved one that you did not receive?  
101 If you could send a message to your deceased loved one, what would it be? 
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Appendix D: The Who-5 Well-Being Index (Staehr Johansen, 1998; Topp et al., 2015) 
  
 
The wording was changed from present perfect to present tense for these items in the 
current study. This was because much of the survey’s content asks questions about the more 
distant past, and these questions are ascertaining participant feelings regarding the past two 
weeks. The new item wording is as follows:  
1. I feel cheerful and in good spirits 
2. I feel calm and relaxed 
3. I feel active and vigorous 
4. I wake up feeling fresh and rested 
5. My daily life is filled with things that interest me 
 
Due to an entry error, one of the response choices (Most of the time) was not included in 
the WHO-5 in the Grief Experiences Survey; as such, the possible responses were: 
 
The response At no time received 0 points, other responses were scored as follows: 2 = 2⅓; 
3 = 3⅓; 4 = 4⅓, 5 = 5. The sum of these was multiplied by 4. 
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Appendix E: Sources Used in Developing Perception/Sense-Making Items 
 
Key:  
ASD = Specific Symptoms of Acute Stress Disorder (Appendix A) 
ASDS = the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (Appendix F) 
SASRQ = Stanford Acute Stress Reaction Questionnaire (Appendix G) 
DDI = Depersonalization/Derealization Inventory (Appendix H) 
DES-II = Dissociative Experiences Scale (Appendix I) 
CDS = Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (Appendix J) 
RTS = Revised Transliminality Scale (Appendix K) 
 
Perception/Sense-Making Items included in the Grief Experiences Survey 
Item 
[All items are introduced with: Think about the time 





1) I had difficulty concentrating/focusing attention Shock ASD; ASDS: 16; SASRQ: 9 
anxiety—62% endorsed, .40 
Item-Scale corr.; DDI: 1,3,21,24; 
DES-II: 2 
2) I felt restless Shock    SASRQ: 2; anxiety—62% 
endorsed, .40 Item-scale corr. 
3) I felt numb Shock    ASD; DDI: 6; ASDS: 1; DDI: 6 
4) I felt distant from my own emotions Shock             ASD; ASDS, 1; SASRQ: 
dissoc.—28% endorsed, .54 Item-
scale corr.; DDI: 8,13; CDS: 9 
5) I felt as if I was in a daze Shock             ASD; ASDS: 2; DDI: 26,28; 
DES-II: 20; CDS: 1 
6) I felt like I was watching things happen from outside 
myself 
Shock              ASD; ASDS: 4; DDI: 10; DES-
II: 7,13; CDS: 3,6,15,23 
7) Memories of the death kept entering my mind Shock              ASD; ASDS: 6; SASRQ: 
anxiety—26% endorsed, .38 
Item-scale correlation 
8) My surroundings seemed strange or unreal Shock                 DDI: 1, 7; ASDS: 3; DES-II: 12 
9) I felt like I was slow to respond to what was happening 
around me 
Shock            SASRQ: dissoc.—25% endorsed, 
.53 Item-scale correlation 
10) I looked in the mirror and felt as though I did not 
recognize myself. 
Shock                SASRQ: 10 dissoc.—10% 
endorsed, .57 Item-scale 
correlation; DES-II: 11 
11) I felt as if I might be losing my mind, but I was 
reluctant to share this with others 
Shock                 Larry Childress 
12) Smells seemed weaker or less noticeable than usual Intrasensory 
Processing         
CDS: 25 
13) Indoor lights seemed so bright that they bothered my 
eyes  
Intrasensory 
Processing         
RTS: 13 
14) Tastes seemed blander or less noticeable than usual Intrasensory 




[All items are introduced with: Think about the time 






15) I felt as if the volume control on my world had been 
turned down 
Intrasensory 
Processing         
Alfred Wilson (see King, 2018) 
16) My vision seemed dulled Intrasensory 
Processing         
DDI: 18 
17) Things I saw looked different to me than how I know 
they really look 
Intrasensory 
Processing         
SASRQ: 11% endorsed; .51 Item-
Scale Correlation; DDI: 11;          
DES-II: 12 
18) People and objects seemed more distant and unclear Intrasensory 
Processing         
DDI: 9; DES-II: 28; CDS: 19 
19) Smells seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual Intrasensory 
Processing         
Andrea Clements; RTS: 19 
20) People and objects seemed closer and clearer Intrasensory 
Processing         
Opposite of #18 (above) 
21) Colors seemed to appear less dull or muted Intrasensory 
Processing 
Opposite of #24 (below) 
22) Tastes seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual Intrasensory 
Processing 
Opposite of #14 (above) 




Opposite of #15 (above) 
24) Colors seemed to appear more vivid and vibrant Intrasensory 
Processing 
Elizabeth Feldstein (see 
Deerwester, 2019) 
25) I felt like I was walking on shifting ground Intersensory 
Processing 
DDI: 19 
26) I felt as if I was in a fog Intersensory 
Processing 
DDI: 26,28; DES-II: 28; CDS: 1 
27) I had a sinking feeling in the pit of my stomach Intersensory 
Processing 
DDI: 3 
28) I felt like I was descending rapidly in an elevator. Intersensory 
Processing  
adapted from Handler, 1999 





Common across multiple sources 
30) I sensed or felt the presence of the person who died Extrasensory 
Processing 
Hallucinations 
see e.g., Castelnovo et al., 2015 





see, e.g., Troyer, 2005, 2014; see 
also Durham Hypnagogic and 
Hypnopompic Questionnaire: 1, 
14 (Jones et al., 2009) 
32) I thought I heard my deceased loved one’s voice. Extrasensory 
Processing 
Hallucinations 




[All items are introduced with: Think about the time 






33) I thought I saw my deceased loved one. Extrasensory 
Processing 
Hallucinations 
Sacks, 2012; Durham 
Hypnagogic and Hypnopompic 
Questionnaire: 7 









see e.g., Troyer, 2005, 2014 
36) Things around me felt unreal or dreamlike Extrasensory 
Processing 
Dreaming       
ASDS: 3; DDI: 5; DES-II: 12,16; 
CDS: 13 
37) It could be hard to tell if I was awake or asleep Extrasensory 
Processing 
Dreaming       
 
DES-II: 15 
38) I had more dreams Extrasensory 
Processing 
Dreaming       
Opposite of 41 (below) 
39) My dreams about my loved one were comforting Extrasensory 
Processing 
Dreaming       
Opposite of #40 (below) 
40) My dreams about my loved one were disturbing Extrasensory 
Processing 
Dreaming       
ASD; ASDS: 7; SASRQ: 6 
41) I had fewer dreams Extrasensory 
Processing 
Dreaming 
Opposite of 38 (above) 
 




ASDS: 14; SASRQ: 1; anxiety—
39%, .43 Item-scale correlation 
43) I felt the presence of my loved one, but could not see, 





Durham Hypnagogic and 
Hypnopompic Questionnaire: 1 
(Jones et al., 2009); Note 
similarity to items 28-33 
assessing hallucinations 




Opposite of 47 (below) 
45) When I first woke up, sometimes initially I didn’t 











[All items are introduced with: Think about the time 






46) My thoughts could come so quickly that I couldn’t 





DDI: 11; RTS: 9 






Opposite of 44 (above) 
48) I experienced an altered state of awareness which I 





49) I had such a heightened awareness of sights and 









51) Time seemed to pass very slowly Time DDI: 2 
52) Events seemed to happen in slow motion Time DDI: 12 
53) Time seemed to go by quickly Time Opposite of #’s 51 & 52 (above) 
54) Events seemed to speed up Time Opposite of #’s 51 & 52 (above) 
55) Time seemed to stand still Time e.g., Neimeyer & Anderson, 2002 
56) I could not keep track of time Time Greene, 2019 
57) It was challenging for me to accurately gauge the 
passage of time 
Time Greene, 2019 
58) I felt that my sense of time didn’t work the way it 
used to 
Time Larry Childress 
  
Perception/Sense-Making Items considered but not included in the Grief Experiences Survey 






I’ve felt irritable and/or had outbursts of anger   Shock        ASD; ASDS: 15; SASRQ: 10 
anxiety—21% endorsed, .49 
Item-scale correlation 
I’ve felt distant from my “normal” self [OR I’ve not had 
the usual sense of who I am] 
Shock ASDS: 4; SASRQ: dissoc.—16% 
endorsed, .55 Item-scale 
correlation 
I’ve felt isolated from the world Shock            DDI; 10; SASRQ: dissoc.—21% 
endorsed, .53 Item-Scale corr. 
My thoughts have seemed blurred Shock            DDI: 11 
  
 163 







I’ve been unable to recall important aspects of the death Shock            ASDS: 5; SASRQ: dissoc.—2% 
endorsed, .37 Item-scale 
correlation 
I’ve tried not to think about the death Shock            ASDS: 10 





My vision seemed sharpened Intra-sensory 
Processing 
Opposite of #16 (above) 
My sensations were more overwhelming than usual Intra-sensory 
Processing 
Exact source(es) not recalled 
I’ve experienced things as if they were doubly real Intra-sensory 
Processing 
Exact source(es) not recalled 
My surroundings appeared as if covered with a haze Inter-sensory 
Processing 
DDI: 17 
I’ve felt off balance Inter-sensory 
Processing 
Similar to #28 (above) 





see e.g., Didion, 2005 
I’ve been unsure if things really happened to me or if I 




 DES-II: 15 






I’ve had the sense of the invisible presence of my loved 





Durham Hypnagogic and 
Hypnopompic Questionnaire: 4 
(Jones et al., 2009) 




Durham Hypnagogic and 
Hypnopompic Questionnaire: 3 
(Jones et al., 2009) 
I’ve experienced an altered state of consciousness in 





RTS: 3, 16  
I’ve behaved in a much more impulsive or uninhibited 






I thought I really knew what some people mean when 






I’ve felt unaware of the passage of time Time DES-II: 20 






Appendix F: Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS) 
Name:         Date: 
Briefly describe your recent traumatic experience: 
Did the experience frighten you? Yes or No 
Please answer each of these questions about how you have felt since the event. Circle one 
number next to each question to indicate how you have felt. 
1 Not at all 
2 Mildly 
3 Medium 
4 Quite a bit 
5 Very much 
1. During or after the trauma, did you ever feel numb or distant from your emotions? 
2. During or after the trauma, did you ever feel in a daze? 
3. During or after the trauma, did things around you ever feel unreal or dreamlike? 
4. During or after the trauma, did you ever feel distant from your normal self or like you 
were watching it happen from outside? 
5. Have you been unable to recall important aspects of the trauma? 
6. Have memories of the trauma kept entering your mind? 
7. Have you had bad dreams or nightmares about the trauma? 
8. Have you felt as if the trauma was about to happen again? 
9. Do you feel very upset when you are reminded of the trauma? 
10. Have you tried not to think about the trauma? 
11. Have you tried not to talk about the trauma? 
12. Have you tried to avoid situations or people that remind you of the trauma? 
13. Have you tried not to feel upset or distressed about the trauma? 
14. Have you had trouble sleeping since the trauma? 
15. Have you felt more irritable since the trauma? 
16. Have you had difficulty concentrating since the trauma? 
17. Have you become more alert to danger since the trauma? 
18. Have you become jumpy since the trauma? 
19. When you are reminded of the trauma, do you sweat or tremble or does your heart beat 
fast? 
(Bryant et al., 2000) 
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Appendix G: Stanford Acute Stress Reaction Questionnaire (SASRQ) 





Appendix H: Depersonalization-Derealization Inventory (DDI) 
(Cox & Swinson, 2002) 
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Appendix I: Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES-II) 


















(Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Carlson & Putnam, 1993)  
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Appendix J: Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS) 
(Sierra & Berrios, 1996, 2000; see also Sierra et al., 2005) 
 
Responses are for Frequency: 0 = never, 1 = rarely, 2 = often, 3 = very often, 4 = all the time 
and for Duration: 1 = a few seconds, 2 = few minutes, 3 = few hours, 4 = about a day, 5 = more 
than a day, 6 = more than a week 
 
1. Out of the blue, I feel strange, as if I were not real or as if I were cut off from this world. 
2. What I see looks ‘flat’ or ‘lifeless’, as if I were looking at a picture. 
3. Parts of my body feel as if they didn’t belong to me. 
4. I have found myself not being frightened at all in situations normally I would find 
frightening or distressing 
5. My favourite activities are no longer enjoyable. 
6. Whilst doing something I have the feeling of being a ‘detached observer’ from myself. 
7. The flavour of meals no longer gives me a feeling of pleasure or distaste. 
8. My body feels very light, as if it were floating on air. 
9. When I weep or laugh, I do not seem to feel any emotions at all. 
10. I have the feeling of not having any thoughts at all, so that when I speak it feels as if my 
words were being uttered by an ‘automaton’. 
11. Familiar voices (including my own) sound remote and unreal. 
12. I have the feeling that my hands or my feet have become larger or smaller. 
13. My surroundings feel detached or unreal, as if there were a veil between me and the 
outside world. 
14. It seems as if things that I have recently done had taken place a long time ago. For 
example, anything which I have done this morning feels as if it were done weeks ago. 
15. Whilst fully awake, I have ‘visions’ in which I can see myself outside, as if I were 
looking at my image in a mirror. 
16. I feel detached from memories of things that have happened to me—as if I had not been 
involved in them. 
17. When in a new situation, it feels as if I have been through it before. 
18. Out of the blue, I find myself not feeling any affection towards my family and close 
friends. 
19. Objects around me seem to look smaller and further away. 
20. I cannot feel properly the objects that I touch with my hands for it feels as if it were not 
me who were touching it. 
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Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (continued) 
 
21. I am unable to picture things in mind. 
22. I feel detached from pain. 
23. I have the feeling of being outside my body 
24. When I move it doesn’t feel as if I were in charge of the movements, so that I feel 
‘automatic’ and mechanical as if I were a ‘robot’. 
25. The smell of things no longer gives me a feeling of pleasure or dislike. 
26. I feel so detached from my thoughts that they seem to have a ‘life’ of their own. 
27. I have to touch myself to make sure that I have a body or a real existence. 
28. I seem to have lost some bodily sensations (e.g., of hunger and thirst) so that when I eat 
or drink, it feels an automatic routine. 
29. Previously familiar places look unfamiliar, as if I had never seen them before. 
 
(Sierra & Berrios, 1996, 2000; see also Sierra et al. 2005) 
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Appendix K: Revised Transliminality Scale (RTS) 
(Houran et al., 2003; Lange et al., 2000) 
 
Your Date of Birth: —/—/— Your Age: — Your Sex: M/F 
1. Horoscopes are right too often for it to be a coincidence. 
2. At times I perform certain little rituals to ward off negative influences.  
3. I have experienced an altered state of consciousness in which I felt that I became cosmically  
enlightened. 
4. At the present time, I am very good at make-believe and imagining. 
5. I have felt that I had received special wisdom, to be communicated to the rest of humanity. 
6. I have sometimes behaved in a much more impulsive or uninhibited way than is usual for me. 
7. I am fascinated by new ideas, whether or not they have practical value. 
8. I have sometimes sensed an evil presence around me, although I could not see it. 
9. My thoughts have sometimes come so quickly that I couldn’t write them all down fast enough.  
10. If I could not pretend or make-believe anymore, I wouldn’t be me I wouldn’t be the same 
person. 
11. Sometimes I experience things as if they were doubly real. 
12. It is sometimes possible for me to be completely immersed in nature or in art and to feel as if 
my whole state of consciousness has somehow been temporarily altered. 
13. Often I have a day when indoor lights seem so bright that they bother my eyes. 
14. I am convinced that I have had at least one experience of telepathy between myself and 
another person. 
15. I am convinced that I am psychic. 
16. I have experienced an altered state of awareness which I believe utterly transformed (in a 
positive manner) the way I looked at myself. 
17. I am convinced that I have had a premonition about the future that came true and which (I 
believe) was not just a coincidence. 
18. I think I really know what some people mean when they talk about mystical experiences. 
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Appendix K: Revised Transliminality Scale (continued) 
19. I have gone through times when smells seemed stronger and more overwhelming than usual.  
20. I can clearly feel again in my imagination such things as: the feeling of a gentle breeze, warm 
sand under bare feet, the softness of fur, cool grass, the warmth of the sun and the smell of 
freshly cut grass.  
21. A person should try to understand their dreams and be guided by or take warnings from 
them.  
22. While listening to my favorite music, in addition to feeling calm, relaxed, happy, etc., I often 
have a feeling of oneness with the music, or of being in another place or time, or vividly 
remembering the past.  
23. At times I somehow feel the presence of someone who is not physically there.  
24. I am convinced that it is possible to gain information about the thoughts, feelings or 
circumstances of another person in a way that does not depend on rational prediction or 
normal sensory channels.  
25. For several days at a time I have had such a heightened awareness of sights and sounds that I 
cannot shut them out.  
26. I sometimes have a feeling of gaining or losing energy when certain people look at me or 
touch me.   
27. Now that I am grown up, I still in some ways believe in such beings as elves, witches, 
leprechauns, fairies, etc. 
28. Sometime people think Im a bit weird because my ideas are so novel.  
29. When listening to organ music or other powerful music, I sometimes feel as if I am being 
lifted up into the air.  
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